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Abstract 
Moral indeterminacy appears to be incompatible with moral realism at first glance 
because moral realists believe that there are objective moral facts in the world, which 
seem determinate. Given the commitment to objective moral facts, moral realists would 
want to argue that there can be a considerable amount of convergence on moral matters. 
However, moral disagreement is too prevalent for realists to be optimistic that there will 
be convergence sometime in the future. Some moral disagreements seem to remain 
irresolvable or even faultless. Since it is reasonable to think that moral disagreements 
arise because there is indeterminacy, moral realists would want to explain indeterminacy 
without any inconsistency or incompatibility.   
I argue that moral realism is compatible with every kind of indeterminacy: 
metaphysical indeterminacy, semantic indeterminacy, and epistemic indeterminacy. 
What I contribute to indeterminacy and moral realism debate is that, in contrast with how 
some philosophers argue that all moral indeterminacy can be reduced to metaphysical 
indeterminacy or epistemicism, I argue that every kind of indeterminacy has its own place. 
I show that each kind of indeterminacy is helpful for moral realists to explain different 
types of moral disagreement: faultless moral disagreement can be explained through 
semantic indeterminacy; irresolvable moral disagreement can be explained through 
metaphysical indeterminacy; resolvable disagreement can be explained through 
epistemicism. 
The upshot of my research is that moral realists can still uphold their tenets on moral 
objectivity and truth while embracing indeterminacy, the cause of disagreement, at the 
same time. If the strength of a metaethical theory is measured by how much explanation 
it can provide, my dissertation shows that moral realism wins over anti-realism in this 
regard.  
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1. Introduction 
Walking on a street, let's say that you come across a £5 note. You ask yourself if 
it is permissible to take a five-pound note. Maybe you reason that, since it is 
permissible to pick up a lucky penny, then it must be permissible to pick up two lucky 
pennies. After all, what's just one more penny? You keep adding one penny to the 
previous amount until you reach the conclusion that it is permissible to take the five-
pound note. However, you could use a similar reasoning process to argue against 
your own conclusion. You know that if you stumble upon a duffle bag full of cash, 
that it is impermissible to take it. You might reason that you cannot take any of it. 
Not even one penny. But what about two pennies? Definitely not two pennies. That 
is worse than taking just one. You reason like this until you conclude that it is 
impermissible to take £5 from the duffle bag. This leaves you in a curious position. 
You originally reasoned that it is permissible to take £5 that you find on the street. 
Now you have reasoned that it is impermissible. Which is it? Perhaps it is 
indeterminate as to whether or not it is permissible or impermissible to take the £5 
on the ground. 
 Such a situation seems like an instance of indeterminacy: it is indeterminate 
whether it is permissible to pick up a specific amount of pounds. This is also an 
instance of moral indeterminacy because we are curious to know whether it is 
morally permissible to take some pounds on the ground without causing harm to 
anyone. Morally indeterminate situations like this are prevalent in our lives. It is 
permissible to drink a glass of wine from a shared bottle, and it is not permissible to 
drink the whole bottle on your own. Then drinking how many glasses of wine is 
borderline permissible? It is permissible to get an abortion on the first day of 
pregnancy, and it is not permissible to get an abortion on the 9th month of pregnancy. 
Then on what day does it become not permissible to get an abortion? Moral agents 
have problems making morally good or right decisions because these kinds of 
morally indeterminate situations are widespread. What should we do when doing φ 
is neither determinately permissible nor determinately not permissible?  
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The aim of my thesis is not to provide an answer to the question “what should 
we do when things are morally indeterminate?” My aim is not to give a normative 
account of what one ought to do under moral uncertainty. Even though it is an 
important practical question to be pursued, my thesis instead focuses on the 
theoretical part of moral indeterminacy. I analyse what exactly moral indeterminacy 
is in regards with epistemic, semantic, and metaphysical aspects, and provide a 
version of moral realism that is compatible with such indeterminacy because, in 
metaethics, not everyone thinks that moral realism is compatible with indeterminacy. 
To state my aim in a clearer way, my goal is not to dissolve indeterminacy. Rather, I 
want to suggest a way for moral realists to endorse indeterminacy in such a way that 
indeterminacy is compatible with realism. If moral realists can successfully explain 
moral indeterminacy, which appears to be incompatible with moral realism at first 
glance, indeterminacy will become useful for moral realists to explain the prevalence 
of moral disagreement, such as faultless disagreement and irresolvable 
disagreement, of which anti-realists have been actively taken to defend their position.  
 
1.1 Motivation: Indeterminacy and Metaethics 
Before delving into those issues, it must be made clear what role moral 
indeterminacy plays in metaethics. I'll explain three roles that indeterminacy plays 
in metaethics in order to highlight some of the problems that I shall be addressing 
in this dissertation.  
First, indeterminacy is a problem to the existing views in metaethics, especially 
to moral realism. It is because indeterminacy seems incompatible with moral realism 
at first glance.1 It seems incompatible because, in moral realism, it is commonly 
accepted that there are objective moral facts and properties, and objective facts 
appear to be determinate. For example, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) argue that 
there are moral fixed points which are determinate, substantive, and non-vacuous 
 
1 In fact, moral indeterminacy could be also problematic for anti-realism. See Baima (2014). 
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moral conceptual truths such as, “It is pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational 
slaughter of a fellow person.” According to David Enoch (2011), there are normative 
truths that are perfectly objective, universal, and absolute, just as respectable as 
empirical or mathematical truths. These truths are such that “we should care about 
our future well-being, that we should not humiliate other people, that we should not 
reason and form beliefs in ways we know to be unreliable” (1).  
Moral realists, such as Shafer-Landau and Enoch, want to hold that moral facts 
are ontologically on a par with non-moral facts, such as scientific or mathematical 
facts. Given that it is not empirically indeterminate whether, e.g., the tree is seven 
feet tall, it is not morally indeterminate whether picking up a five-pound note is 
morally permissible. According to moral realism, regardless of whether one holds 
robust moral realism (non-naturalism) or Cornell realism (naturalism)2, there is fact 
of the matter in moral reality. 
Given their commitment to objective moral facts, moral realists would want to 
argue that there can be a considerable amount of convergence on moral matters. We 
disagree because moral facts are not discovered enough to settle disagreement. Once 
more moral facts are discovered, there will be convergence on moral matters. This 
runs parallel with how mathematical and scientific facts converge as more 
mathematical and scientific facts are discovered.3  
However, moral disagreement is too prevalent for realists to be naively 
optimistic that there will be convergence sometime in the future. Some moral 
disagreements seem to remain irresolvable or even faultless. Acknowledging that 
moral disagreement can sometimes be irresolvable, Shafer-Landau (1994) takes 
indeterminacy as the key to explaining irresolvable and intractable moral 
disagreement.4 Even though indeterminacy appears to be incompatible with moral 
 
2 There can be other positions of moral realism, such as moral intuitionism and constructivism, which are 
evidence-dependent. I bracket these positions in my thesis because I want to focus on the mind-independent 
accounts of moral realism. 
3 Enoch acknowledges that such a convergence would look like a miracle, but he explains it with the notion of 
pre-established harmony. See Enoch (2011: 168-176). 
4 This position is completely opposite from what Enoch (2009) holds. I talk more about this point in chapter 5. 
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realism, moral realists might be able to find indeterminacy useful to explain moral 
disagreement.  
Therefore, the second role that indeterminacy plays in metaethics is that it has 
the potential to become a tool for moral realists to explain disagreement. For 
example, David Brink (1989: 202) thinks that moral ties are possible. Different moral 
considerations, which are equally and objectively valuable, can be incommensurable. 
It is possible that both parties in disagreement are not systemically mistaken: their 
dispute might have no unique resolution. If moral realists can bring in indeterminacy 
into this debate and say that moral ties originate from metaphysical indeterminacy, 
Brink’s explanation might become more powerful. David Wiggins (1990: 77) also 
acknowledges that, in the face of genuine disagreement, there could be no standpoint 
from which alternative choices could ever be practically deliberated. Likewise, if 
moral realists can say that genuine moral disagreement arises from indeterminacy 
in the world, then Wiggin’s explanation will be able to gain more weight. 
The third role that indeterminacy plays in metaethics is providing an argument 
to explain moral disagreement, especially for anti-realists. It is easier for anti-realists 
than realists to appeal to indeterminacy to explain moral disagreement because anti-
realists can easily say that moral indeterminacy is simply the differences in our 
opinions which cannot reach convergence. For anti-realists, moral disagreement is 
prevalent due to our differences in social norms, subjective values, and attitudes. 
Such an argument is used by Mackie (1977: 36) to undermine moral objectivity: 
moral disagreement is intractable because there is an enormous amount of variation 
in our moral judgments.  
In response, moral realists commonly appeal to moral luck or moral intuition 
which, somehow, makes some of us epistemically privileged to determinate and 
objective moral knowledge.5 Moral disagreement is nothing but the conflict between 
those who have such privileged epistemic access to objective moral knowledge and 
 
5 For example, Robert Audi, Jonathan Dancy, David Enoch, Michael Huemer, David McNaughton, and Russ 
Shafer-Landau are happy to be called moral intuitionists. 
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those who do not. Therefore, it is always the case that one party, the one who does 
not have access to objective moral knowledge, is at fault.  
Nonetheless, some objective moral knowledge must be unknowable to us due to 
our cognitive limitations. Then moral realism can easily lead to scepticism because 
we do now know how much of this is knowledge unknowable. Due to the prevalence 
of moral disagreement which originates from our cognitive limitations, it could turn 
out to be that moral knowledge is impossible.6 No moral realists would want to draw 
such a conclusion. 
 
1.2 The Goal of Dissertation 
If it can be shown that moral realism can appeal to indeterminacy without any 
inconsistency or incompatibility to explain prevalent moral disagreement better 
than anti-realists do, indeterminacy will no longer be a problem to moral realism. 
Indeterminacy will be, in fact, a useful tool for moral realist to explain prevalent and 
irresolvable moral disagreement. If moral realists can show that indeterminacy 
cannot be dispensed easily because it is a necessary part of the objective moral reality, 
the anti-realists’ argument from moral disagreement against moral realism will lose 
its force. 
My project is worth pursuing because indeterminacy is prevalent and 
indispensable in moral reality. Moral realists would want to be able to explain moral 
disagreement by appealing to indeterminacy. Not only does Shafer-Landau (1994: 
336) make a similar point: “If we allow for moral indeterminacy…, then we have a 
promising explanation of disagreement for the objectivist.”, Parfit (2011: 562) also 
agrees: “If some normative questions are indeterminate, having no answer, this 
would provide another explanation of some normative disagreements.” Therefore, 
 
6 Graham Oddie(2005) says, “Robust moral realists hold that there are moral facts and that these facts play no 
sort of causal explanatory role. […] It follows that we have strong reason to believe that, were robust moral 
realism true, our moral beliefs would fail to display epistemic merits. Moral knowledge, were robust realism true, 
would be impossible.” 
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there are good reasons for moral realists to appeal to indeterminacy to explain moral 
disagreement. Then the first step for moral realists is to provide a version of moral 
realism that is compatible with indeterminacy. 
This is what I argue for in my dissertation. I argue that moral realism is 
compatible with every kind of indeterminacy: metaphysical indeterminacy, semantic 
indeterminacy, and epistemic indeterminacy.7 Therefore, indeterminacy is no longer 
a problem for moral realism.8 Rather, indeterminacy becomes a useful tool for moral 
realists to explain disagreement. What I aim to contribute to indeterminacy and 
moral realism debate is that, in contrast with how some philosophers argue that 
moral indeterminacy is just ontic indeterminacy (Schoenfield 2015) or 
indeterminacy is just all epistemic (Williamson 1994), I argue that every kind of 
indeterminacy has its own place. The fact that there are three kinds of indeterminacy 
will be helpful for moral realists to explain moral disagreement, namely faultless 
disagreement, irresolvable disagreement, and resolvable disagreement.  
The upshot of my research is that while moral realists can explain moral 
disagreement through metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic indeterminacy, moral 
anti-realists cannot, unfortunately, make the same move. It seems like a bad result 
for anti-realists because anti-realists’ explanation of indeterminacy only appeals to 
the differences in our culture or opinions. In contrast, realists’ explanation of 
indeterminacy appeals to a much broader range: semantic indeterminacy originating 
from our language, metaphysical indeterminacy originating from our world, and 
epistemic indeterminacy originating from us. If the strength of a theory is measured 
by how much explanation it can provide, moral realism wins over anti-realism. It is 
because moral realism has more explanatory power regarding indeterminacy and 
moral disagreement.  
 
7 I am not sure if these three the only kinds, but it would be sufficient to show that it is compatible with these 
three. I assume that they are not exhaustive whereas Schoenfield (2015) assumes that they are exhaustive with 
one another. 
8 For example, arguing that indeterminacy is incompatible with moral realism, Constantinescu (2014) concludes 
that moral realism is false. 
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In §2, I characterize what moral realism is and why indeterminacy matters in 
moral realism. In §3, I distinguish three different types – metaphysical, semantic, 
and epistemic – of indeterminacy and show how each type affects metaethics. In §4, 
I show how moral realism can be compatible with each type of indeterminacy. In §5, 
I explain how moral realists can appeal to each type of indeterminacy to explain 
moral disagreement and lay out the upshots regarding the realism versus anti-
realism debate in metaethics. 
 
2. Moral Realism 
Before I can show how indeterminacy and moral realism are compatible with 
each other, I need to explain first what moral realism is. Even though there are many 
branches of moral realism, I focus on the minimal tenets of moral realism to which 
every type of moral realists, such as non-naturalistic robust moral realists like David 
Enoch (2011) and Russ Shafer-Landau (2003, 2007), and naturalistic moral realists 
like Sturgeon (1988), Boyd (1988), and Brink (1989), would agree. I call the view that 
I cash out here Minimal Moral Realism. The reason I focus on minimal moral realism 
is that these tenets are the common principles that all moral realists share. In other 
words, these tenets are the necessary conditions for moral realism. These tenets are 
formulated as neutral as possible so that we are talking about the same moral realism 
from the outset. If indeterminacy is compatible with these tenets, then there’s 
nothing about moral realism as such that’s incompatible with indeterminacy. If 
realists want to appeal to indeterminacy to explain disagreement, then moral realists 
need to make sure that their version of moral realism does not accept additional 
tenets that make it incompatible with indeterminacy.  
Cashing out this minimal moral realism, three related dimensions of moral 
realism are to be distinguished: metaphysics, semantics, and epistemology of moral 
realism. Distinguishing these aspects is important for two reasons. First, it helps us 
pinpoint which tenets are essential in characterizing moral realism. Second, it helps 
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us make connections to metaphysical, epistemic, and semantic indeterminacy. In 
this chapter, I accomplish three things. First, in §2.1, I present the standard way of 
characterizing minimal moral realism. I point out a problem in characterizing moral 
realism in the current literature. Therefore, in §2.2, I argue that classical logic is the 
default position that realists should retain. In §2.3, I modify the way of characterizing 
minimal moral realism by motivating the problem of creeping minimalism. I argue 
that realists should accept a relatively robust account of truth in order to have a 
distinct realist theory that is distinguishable from anti-realism. 
 
2.1 The Minimal Moral Realism 
In this section, I list the key tenets of moral realism by distinguishing the tenets 
that concern the metaphysics of morality from the tenets that concern the semantics 
and epistemology of morality. It is very common to describe the tenets of moral 
realism without distinguishing different philosophical implications of these tenets. 
For example, Sarah McGrath (2010) formulates moral realism to be a conjunction of 
Cognitivism (paradigmatic moral judgments are truth-apt), Objectivity (which moral 
judgments are true does not depend on what we accept or believe), and No Error 
Theory (at least some judgments are true). While Cognitivism and No Error Theory 
indicate some important features of moral language, Objectivity points towards a 
more metaphysical aspect of moral truth.9 Similarly, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord's (1986: 
3) characterization is as follows: “Realism involves embracing just two theses: (1) the 
claims in question, when literally construed, are literally true or false (cognitivism), 
and (2) some are literally true.” The first claim is about a bivalent feature of moral 
language, whereas the second is about metaphysics – how the moral reality out there 
makes the statements literally true.  
I sense some problems here. First, the tenets regarding the metaphysics of 
morality, moral semantics, and moral truths are intermixed without the order of 
 
9 If some moral judgements are about moral beliefs or propositions, they could go beyond language. 
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importance. Since the tenets regarding the metaphysics of morality should be the 
most important ones for moral realism as it is a metaphysical position, the 
metaphysical theses should be more emphasized than other tenets. Second, none of 
the tenets describes how moral reality and the moral language interact with another 
so that the moral sentences get to be true. They state that moral claims are truth-apt, 
but it is less clear why moral claims are truth-apt and what kind of truth theories 
moral realists endorse. Therefore, I want to solve these problems by identifying the 
tenets with their metaphysical, epistemological, and language aspects and by 
suggesting a theory of truth to which moral realism should adhere to. Some moral 
realists might want to be neutral about which theory of truth is correct, but I will 
show that, in §2.5, moral realists have most reason to accept a truthmaker theory of 
truth than other theories. 
Standardly, moral realism is, as the name indicates, known as defending the view 
that the matters regarding morality are real. What moral realists mean by ‘real’ is 
that the moral facts, such as the fact that murder is wrong, exist just as mathematical 
facts (like the fact that two plus two is four) or scientific facts (such as the 
acceleration of gravity is -9.81 m/s2). Mathematical facts and scientific facts are 
commonly considered as objective facts. The fact that two plus two equals four does 
not depend on human minds. Even if every human being believes that two plus two 
equals five, it does not make the fact that two plus two equals four false. All humans 
would be mistaken in believing that two plus two equals five. Mathematical facts and 
scientific facts are out there in the world, waiting for our discovery. Likewise, moral 
facts are out there in the world, too, waiting for our discovery.10 Hence, the following 
metaphysical tenet (M): 
 
10 Notice that how I characterize moral realism is different from how Cuneo and Shafer-Landau characterizes 
moral realism. According to them, all moral realists would agree that there are moral truths, but relaxed moral 
realists, also known as metaphysical quietists, would reject that these truths have any metaphysical implications. 
They believe that moral realism can be metaphysically light. The main proponents of metaphysical quietism are 
Nagel (1986), Parfit (2011), and Scanlon (2000), Dworkin, and Kramer. I believe that they are wrong. In my other 
paper, I argue that quietists can’t remain silent on the metaphysical issues in realism, which ground their whole 
theory. See Kim (2015). 
10 
 
  (M) OBJECTIVITY: There are moral facts in the world.11 
Notice that this characterization of realism has two distinct features of realism 
as Devitt (1991) and Wright (1993) acknowledge. First is the existence claim, second 
evidence-independence claim. For example, to be a realist about protons is to hold 
that protons exist as well as to hold that their existence and nature is independent of 
humans. Similarly, to be a moral realist is to hold that moral facts exist, and their 
nature is independent of any evidence we have. Such a claim is endorsed by David 
Brink (1989). His construal of moral realism consists of two claims: “There are moral 
facts or truths, and (2) these facts or truths are independent of the evidence for them” 
(17). In a similar vein, according to David Enoch (2011: 216), a robust moral realist: 
“asserts that there are perfectly objective, irreducibly normative moral and other 
normative truths.”12 Their existence is independent of the cognitive activities of the 
mind. Devitt acknowledges that the existence of the mind cannot be characterized as 
existing mind-independently. Therefore, I characterize the objectiveness of moral 
facts as evidence-independence rather than mind-independence.13 To say that an 
object has objective existence is, according to Devitt (1991: 15), 
not to say that it is unknowable. It is to say that it is not constituted by our 
knowledge, by our epistemic values, by our capacity to refer to it, by the 
synthesizing power of the mind, by our imposition of concepts, theories, or 
languages. 
Given that there are moral facts in the world, moral realists need to explain the issues 
regarding representation and truth. How are these facts represented in our language? 
A moral realist would say that moral sentences express propositions, and these 
 
11 What type of facts are moral facts? If one considers moral facts as non-natural, just like mathematical facts, 
one is a non-naturalist about morality. This view is known to be a robust form of moral realism. If one considers 
moral facts as natural, just like scientific facts, one is a naturalist about morality. This view is known as Cornell 
realism. What makes the robust form of moral realism different from Cornell realism, a form of naturalist moral 
realism, is its endorsement of reducibility of moral facts. While Cornell realists believe that moral facts can be 
equated with or reducible to natural facts, robust moral realists believe that moral facts cannot be equated with 
natural facts. Cornell realism, also known as naturalistic non-reductionism, is defended by Sturgeon (1988), 
Boyd (1988), and Brink (1989). However, since I am concerned with the minimal moral realism, I claim that both 
non-naturalists and naturalists would agree to (M). 
12 Obviously, moral realists are not claiming that all moral facts are like this. Enoch continues, “If there are some 
values, then, that are somehow available only locally, in a culture-dependent way, this is not inconsistent with 
Robust Realism.” 
13 This is to follow McGinn (2002) and Brink (1989). 
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propositions reflect how the world is. For realists, the truths of a domain become 
true in virtue of an evidence-independent reality. Therefore, moral sentences are 
truth-evaluable. In other words, moral sentences can be true or false: they are truth-
apt. If one thinks that moral sentences are truth-apt, then one endorses cognitivism. 
Hence, the tenet regarding the semantics (S): 
(S1) COGNITIVISM: Moral sentences are truth-apt. 
According to cognitivism, moral judgments are the beliefs which represent the world 
as containing normative facts. In other words, “the meaning of a declarative sentence 
[in Realism] consists in its possibly unrecognisable or verification-transcendent 
truth condition” (Rasmussen and Ravnkilde 1982: 379). To moral realists, these 
normative facts are objective moral facts in the world. Therefore, moral sentences 
which express our beliefs and judgments about the moral facts in the world have a 
representational direction of fit. When the direction of fit from our judgment to the 
world matches with one another, the moral judgment is true. If not, false. 
(S2) NO ERROR THEORY: Some moral sentences are true. 
Given (M), moral realism rejects error theory. Error theory is a branch of 
cognitivism because error theorists also believe that moral sentences are truth-apt. 
However, according to error theory, none of the moral sentences are true because 
there are no moral facts in the world. There is nothing that makes moral sentences 
true. Therefore, all moral sentences, such as “lying is wrong”, are false. According to 
moral realism, there are objective moral facts in the world. It follows that, at least, 
some moral sentences are true. 
However, these three tenets are not good enough to characterize minimal moral 
realism. It is easy to say that, in the moral domain, certain entities exist, and some 
of the propositions of the given domain are true. However, the claims regarding truth 
are not justified unless we answer these questions: What kind of truth does moral 
realism require? How are these sentences true, and what kind of logical rules do 
moral truths obey? 
12 
 
Answering these questions might make minimal moral realism no longer 
minimal because one might have to dig deeper into theories of truth, semantics, and 
metaphysics.14 My motivation to take moral realism another step regarding truth, 
meaning, and logic is to make clear what exactly moral realism is. Moral realists 
might want to remain neutral on the theories of truth or not even talk about how 
metaphysics work. However, since I think that realists should ultimately have 
something to say about semantics and truth in their complete theory, I argue that 
there is a need for adding new tenets in supplementing moral realism, regarding 
truth-theory and classical logic. 15  These new tenets are not necessary for moral 
realism, but I present my arguments with cost and benefit aspects: it is costly for 
realists to accept non-classical logic (§2.2) and minimalism about truth (§2.3).16 
 
2.2 The Default Position: Classical Logic for Moral Realism 
In this section, I argue that, classical logic should be the default position for 
moral realism to explain indeterminacy. Moral realism should be compatible with 
classical logic, other things being equal. There’s a cost for moral realism if moral 
realism needs to accept non-classical logic. It is because, once one accepts non-
classical logic, one gives up on the reliable method of inference. According to Richard 
Boyd (1988)’s characterization of moral realism, (a) moral statements are true or 
false, (b) the truth or falsity of moral statements is independent of our moral 
opinions or theories, and (c) ordinary canons of moral reasoning constitute a reliable 
 
14 For example, discussions on moral semantics have been advanced by Brink (2001), Schroeder (2012), Silk 
(2013), and Ridge (2014). 
15 There has been standard philosophical debate on realism versus anti-realism involving meaning, truth, and 
logic as long discussed from Frege, Wittgenstein, McDowell (1976), Putnam (1977), Dummett (1978), Wright 
(1986) to Williamson (1994). Moral realism is realism applied to the moral domain. Therefore, how to construe 
moral realism should draw connections to the existing literature on metaphysical realism. Such a debate is 
advanced by the following literature, for example: Rasmussen and Ravnkilde (1982), Williamson (2007), and 
Murzi (2010). 
16 This point is also similarly made by Shieh (2018) as a necessary and sufficient condition for realism: “Strict 
bivalence, on the later view, is necessary but not sufficient for semantic realism. Rather, strict bivalence and 
classical semantics are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for realism.”  
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method for obtaining and improving moral knowledge. The reliable method for 
obtaining and improving moral knowledge is to retain classical logic.17 
First, there are advantages of retaining classical logic if one’s a realist. For 
instance, consider the principle of bivalence. Frege was a strong advocate of the 
principle of bivalence, one of the main principles of classical logic, which states 
that “every sentence that has a definite sense, considered, when necessary, as uttered 
on a particular occasion by a particular speaker, is determinately either true or false” 
(Dummett 2006: 47). It is because the semantic value of sentences is either true 
when the predicate functions take the objects to truth, or false when the predicate 
functions do not take the objects to truth. The principle of bivalence seems to have a 
strong connection with the objective reality in the world because “we do not need to 
be able to tell whether the predicate is true or false of the object: but reality must 
determine either that it is true of it or that it is false of it” (48). We do not get to 
decide whether a predicate is applied to an object or not. It does not matter either 
whether we know or we are able to know that a predicate is applied.  
Such a Fregean or Truth-conditional way of thinking about the sentences 
naturally lead us to accept the principle of bivalence because reality determines 
whether the truth-conditions obtain or not. If the truth-conditions obtain, the 
sentence is true. If not, false. As Williamson (1994: 186) points out, “classical 
semantics and logic are vastly superior to the alternatives in simplicity, power, past 
success, and integration with theories in other domains.” Therefore, it would be a 
good idea to stick to the truth-conditional semantics and classical logic when moral 
realists try to explain indeterminacy and vagueness. 
Second, there is a cost when one gives up on classical logic. The costs of rejecting 
the principle of bivalence are as follows. According to Edgington (1980: 155), giving 
up the principle of bivalence “involves a large sacrifice of inferential practice”. Since 
 
17 Dummett (1982: 85) makes a separate point that “Realism requires us to hold both that, for statements of the 
given class, we have a notion of truth under which each statement is determinately either true or false, and also 
that an understanding of those statements consists in a knowledge of the conditions under which they are true.” 
However, I think that classical logic should be a default position for realism anyway for making reliable inference. 
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the principle of bivalence states that a statement is true or false, such a principle 
helps us with a lot of common-sensical inferential practice. For example, imagine 
that there was a theft at the store. The CCTV showed that there was only one thief 
breaking into the store. The police caught two suspects, Lisa and Amy. Lisa is a thief, 
or Lisa is not a thief. If Lisa is not a thief, then Amy is a thief. Such a simple inference 
process like this does not make sense once we reject the principle of bivalence.  
Consider that one accepts intuitionistic logic, so denies a double negation 
elimination rule which is a theorem of classical logic. Let’s assume that one wants to 
explain what Jean Valjean has done – stealing candlesticks from Bishop Myriel – in 
Les Miserables is wrong but could be excused due to his excruciating circumstance 
and due to the mercy of Bishop Myriel. She would say something like, “Jean Valjean 
could be excused for what he has done. However, I am not saying that stealing is not 
wrong.” She would want to express that stealing is still wrong, but Jean Valjean could 
be excused from his wrongdoings. However, if she accepts intuitionistic logic, 
“stealing is wrong” cannot be derived from “I am not saying that stealing is not 
wrong.” Such an inference is not a reliable source of gaining moral knowledge. 
This point will become important as we consider several options to explain 
indeterminacy in chapter 3. While many philosophers accept non-classical solutions 
to indeterminacy such as supervaluationism or intuitionism, I will argue that moral 
realists can explain indeterminacy while remaining fully classical. 18  Applying 
bivalence to vague moral sentences, moral sentences are still either true or false. 
When a moral predicate is applied to a property, the sentence is true. When it is not, 
the sentence is false. Some moral realists seem to be agreeing with the point, too. 
The moral realist, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (1986: 3), seems to hold fast to the 
principle of bivalence, as he thinks that the moral claims are literally, or 
determinately, true or false. Accepting only classical logic makes my thesis harder to 
 
18 For example, treatment to future contingent sentences such as “There will be a sea battle tomorrow” and liar 
sentences “this sentence is false” seems to require us to give up on classical logic because these sentences do not 
appear to obey the principle of bivalence. However, these cases are not of my interest. 
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prove because I cannot accept a non-classical explanation of indeterminacy. I add a 
supplementary tenet regarding logic (L):  
(L1) BIVALENCE: For all sentences in the moral domain, they are 
either true or false. 
Once we have the principle of bivalence, it is easier to derive the law of excluded 
middle from the principle.19 Therefore, a tenet on the law of excluded middle is added: 
(L2) THE LAW OF EXCLUDED MIDDLE: For any moral 
sentence p, either p or not p. 
 
2.3 Truthmaker Theory for Moral Realism 
In this section, I argue that moral realism needs to be strengthened with a more 
relatively robust account of truth because of the problem of creeping minimalism. As 
we have seen in the previous sections, the notion of truth deals with how the world 
is. A truth-value is assigned to the truth-bearer which meaningfully makes claims 
about what the world is like. When the truth-bearers, such as beliefs, propositions, 
sentences, and utterances, are in accord with the reality or represent a fact, they are 
true. In this section, I clarify the notion of truth that moral realists should accept. I 
first argue that realists cannot be minimalists about everything. Second, I argue that 
realists would want to accept a truthmaker theory over other truth theories such as 
deflationism or correspondence theory of truth. 
 
19 For example, A valid derivation of BIV from LEM and T-schema (“p” is true iff P) has been proposed by Susan 
Haack (1975: 67-68). She construes it as follows: 
1  T‘p’ ↔ p  T-schema  
2  p ∨ ¬p  Excluded Third  
3(3)  p  Assumption  
4(3)  T‘p’  Def. of ‘↔’ and MPP (1,3)  
5(5)  ¬p  Assumption  
6(5)  T‘¬p’  ¬p/p(1); Def. of ‘↔’ and MPP(1,5)  
7(3)  T‘p’ ∨ T‘¬p’  Introduction of adjunction (4)  
8(5)  T‘p’ ∨ T‘¬p’  Introduction of adjunction (6)  
9  T‘p’ ∨ T‘¬p’  elimin. of assumptions (2,3,5,7,8)  
10  T‘p’ ∨ F‘p’  Def. of ‘F’ (9)  
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2.3.1 The Problem of Creeping Minimalism 
In this section, I motivate the problem of creeping minimalism and argue that 
realists need to seriously respond to this problem. In §2.1, I formulated a version of 
minimal moral realism which accepts (M), (S1), and (S2). If a moral realist accepts 
only (S1), (S2), and (M), there is a worry that nowadays there is no difference 
between moral realism and anti-realism (Asay 2013, Simpson 2018). It is because 
both realists and anti-realists take the semantic or psychological notions like truth 
and belief into account to explain moral matters. The problem is called “creeping 
minimalism.” This problem is worrisome for realists because the line that divides 
moral realists from anti-realists becomes blurry when the quasi-realist program 
starts to resemble realism more and more.20  
During the “good old days,” as Dreier (2004) says, only moral realists could 
claim that there are moral propositions, truths, facts, and properties. The emotivists 
like A. J. Ayer (1936) claimed that there are no moral propositions. Known as the 
arch error-theorist, J. L. Mackie (1977) denied the existence of moral properties; 
therefore, concluding that all moral sentences were false.21  
Nowadays, adopting deflationary or minimalist notions of propositions, truth, 
facts, and properties, there is nothing that contemporary expressivists cannot accept. 
What has happened here is that moral propositions, truths, facts, and properties, 
which used to belong to moral realism exclusively, can also be claimed by moral anti-
realists who are willing to adopt deflationism or minimalism about truth.22 Once the 
merits of the minimalist view on truth are acknowledged, anti-realists start to 
embrace everything – moral propositions, truths, facts, and properties – which are 
 
20 Karen Bennett (2009) identifies such blurring with the effect of 'difference-minimization'. 
21 To be more accurate, Mackie (1977: 15-17) claimed that his error theory is purely a second-order view. He 
insisted that his second-order error theory is logically independent of any first-order moral views. Therefore, the 
first-order moral claims, claims regarding what we morally ought to do or ought not to do, can still be true or 
false. However, there is some dispute over how to interpret Mackie’s error theory, whether it really has no 
implications on the first-order moral theories. See Olson (2011). 
22 See Blackburn (2006) and Schroeder (2008), developing semantics for moral anti-realism with deflationism. 
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the crucial elements that the realists exclusively and originally claimed. James Dreier 
(2004) has already foreseen the problem of creeping minimalism: 
Minimalism sucks the substance out of heavy-duty metaphysical concepts. If 
successful, it can help expressivism recapture the ordinary realist language of 
ethics. But in so doing it also threatens to make irrealism indistinguishable 
from realism. That is the problem of Creeping Minimalism (26). 
Nowadays, moral anti-realists endorse moral truths. I will explain in detail in 
the next section, but to explain briefly, Simon Blackburn (1998) and Allan Gibbard 
(2003) seek to claim everything that moral realists claim. For example, anti-realists 
can now say that “‘Murder is wrong’ is true.” As a quasi-realist, Blackburn (1998: 79, 
311-312) accepts that moral propositions and truths represent moral facts which can 
be mind-independent. According to Blackburn (2010: 4), our moral thoughts are 
beliefs; such a claim used to be asserted by moral realists. Michael Ridge (2007b), 
who is an ecumenical expressivist, accepts truth-aptness of normative discourse 
while holding expressivism at the same time. 23  The motivation behind hybrid 
expressivism, defended by Mark Schroeder (2015), is to be an expressivist about 
truth yet to give an account for the semantics of complex sentences with moral parts. 
Expressivists now understand moral sentences as expressing components about our 
belief and attitude, namely propositions, the fundamental bearers of truth and falsity. 
Since they endorse moral truths, anti-realism no longer demands scepticism about 
morality.24  
In the face of creeping minimalism, what should moral realists do? There are 
several responses. First response is that it’s not the case that realism starts collapsing 
into anti-realism through minimalism. 25  It’s the other way around. Anti-realism 
starts looking like realism, so it’s bad for anti-realism. In other words, realists should 
happily accept deflationism and consider it as one of the ways to be a realist. For 
 
23 Ecumenical expressivists say that normative statements express hybrid, relational states of mind. These are 
complex states comprised of both representational and nonrepresentational component. 
24 In Fine (2001)’s terms, such forms of anti-realisms are non-sceptical. 
25 This is the point that Crispin Wright makes. He thinks that anti-realism with minimalist notion of truth 
collapses into realism. See Wright (1985). 
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example, that is the move that ‘relaxed moral realists’ make. The second response is 
that moral realists can try to adopt more robust types of truth-theories which have 
metaphysical implications, such as a correspondence notion of truth or truthmaker 
theory.  
In §2.4.2, I argue that the first response is not satisfactory enough. Realists can 
happily accept minimalism about truth but only conditionally. If one is a moral 
realist who wants minimalism about truth, one needs to supplement realism with a 
more robust and substantive theory of facts or propositions. In other words, a moral 
realist cannot be a minimalist about everything and still be a realist.  
Regarding the second response, I argue that, for moral realism, truthmaker 
theory is a better theory than a correspondence theory of truth. In §2.4.3, I argue 
that a moral realist does not have reasons to accept the correspondence theory of 
truth. In §2.4.4, I argue that a moral realist has most reason to accept truthmaker 
theory. Such a characterization of truth in moral realism will help us talk about 
metaphysical and semantic indeterminacy in the later chapters. 
 
2.3.2 Combining Only Minimalism and Realism Is Not Good Enough 
In this section, I argue that realists cannot just accept minimalism about truth. 
If a realist wants to accept minimalism about truth, she needs a substantive theory 
about facts, beliefs, or propositions to supplement the realist picture. Minimalism 
about truth, only by itself, is not good enough for realism. 
Let me start with explaining what minimalism about truth is and why anti-
realists would welcome minimalism. Simply put, minimalism is one of the ways to 
interpret deflationism about truth. Since Tarski, truth schema - <p> is true iff p - has 
been central to the discussions about truth. If one is a deflationist about the T-
schema, the instances of T-schema are conceptually and explanatorily fundamental. 
However, if one is an inflationist about the T-schema, truth is not deflated to the T-
schema. Truth is something that robustly exists out in the world.  
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Deflationism about truth is popular nowadays. According to Daniel Stoljar and 
Nic Damnjanovic (2010), there are two reasons for the popularity of deflationism. 
One reason is that deflationism treats truth as a semantic notion, taking its place 
along with other semantic notions such as reference, meaning, and content. The 
other reason regards its anti-metaphysical stance: “Deflationism seems to deflate a 
grand metaphysical puzzle, a puzzle about the nature of truth, and much of modern 
philosophy is marked by a profound scepticism of metaphysics”.26 While there are 
many varieties of deflationism, I focus on minimalism in my thesis. 
Advocated by Horwich (1998a, 1998b), minimalism takes truth to have a 
fundamental logico-expressive function. Minimalistic truth is a useful device that 
helps us make logical inferences. For example, from the proposition that the Earth 
circles around the Sun, we infer that it is true that the Earth circles around the Sun, 
and vice versa. This feature allows us to use language expressively, especially about 
acceptance of a collection of claims. For example, if one is a devout Catholic, she can 
say that “everything the pope said about theological matters is true.”  
The key feature of minimalistic truth that I want to focus on is its epistemological 
role. The T-schema is epistemologically fundamental in that linguistically competent 
language users are disposed to accept the instances of the schema (Armour-Garb 
2012: 271). In other words, the meaning of truth is fixed by the language users’ 
inclination to accept the instances of T-schema. When we assert that “It is true that 
P”, we are not predicating a robust notion of truth to the statement. Rather, it is 
merely asserting that P. So, we can say that minimalism about truth is the view that 
truth is given by something like an assertibility-relation between sentences, rather 
than a metaphysics of truth. 
Therefore, applying minimalism about truth to moral anti-realism, modern day 
anti-realists, such as expressivists, are happy to explain how moral statements are 
truth-apt.27 Following Horwich (1998b: 88), an expressivist can easily appeal to the 
 
26 I bracket Eklund (2017)’s objection against deflationism being anti-metaphysical for now. 
27 See M. Smith (1994) for the defence of minimalism in expressivism. 
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assertibility-relation that the nature of moral sentences can be characterized “by 
supposing, very roughly speaking, that the meaning of 'X is good' is sometimes given 
by the rule that a person is in a position to assert it when he is aware that he values 
X.” For example, if a Utilitarian asserts that “‘Giving to charity is morally good’ is 
true”, ‘giving to charity is morally right’ is true for the utilitarian iff giving to charity 
maximizes utility. <p> is true relative to certain norms. Such a position is defended 
by Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism that a moral statement is true for the speaker 
iff the statement satisfies the norm of the speaker. 
A minimalist notion of truth cannot be objectively factual because it inevitably 
reflects the norms of evaluation from individual speakers. Let’s say that the utterance, 
“John was kissing Mary”, is true on a certain Saturday night. Such an utterance is, 
according to Field (1994: 438), “disquotationally true for me iff it is true relative to 
the time that I regard as appropriate with the implicit indexical in it.” Similarly, 
moral sentences are “disquotationally true for me iff it is true relative to the norms I 
regard as appropriate to associate with the evaluative terms” (439). When 
expressivism is combined with a minimalist notion of truth, “there is no further fact 
here - no fact about nonrelativized oughts, or about which of the norms that we might 
relativize to is "objectively correct"” (440).  
Blackburn is quite optimistic about what expressivism can explain with 
minimalism about truth on its side. With the minimalistic notion of truth, anti-
realists can refute the charge that there is no normativity in moral anti-realism. The 
objection is such that if the primary function of moral sentences is just expressing 
the speaker’s own values and attitudes, there is no justification behind applying 
moral sentences to others. Why ought they follow some values and attitudes from 
another person, which could be arbitrary and bad? Normativity seems to be lacking 
in moral sentences asserted by anti-realists.  
However, adopting minimalism about truth, one can secure normativity by 
appealing to intersubjectivity, possibly appealing to the norm of the society. “Slavery 
is a bad system” is equivalent to “It is true that slavery is bad”. In what sense is it 
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true? Blackburn (1998: 305) argues that such a sentence is equivalent to “Our 
opinion is this: slavery is a bad system.” And even more, by saying that “Slavery is a 
bad system. That is an opinion reflecting an independent order of reason”, an 
expressivist can claim something about normative truth in moral sentences. So far, 
minimalism about truth combined with expressivism seems to be good for anti-
realists, not for realists.28 It is because the notion of truth has changed to reflect the 
norms of the speakers, not reflecting the objective moral facts in the world, which 
are unchangeable regardless of what opinions or norms the speakers hold. 
Therefore, if a moral realist adopts just the minimalist notion of truth, such a 
notion cannot deliver what the realist wants from truth. What realists want is 
objectivity which is fully factual. Moral realism is a metaphysical-first view which 
pushes for the existence of objective moral facts. These moral facts are evidence-
independent in a way that they are not dependent on social norms or the opinions of 
some communities. When moral realists say “<p> is true”, <p> should reflect an 
unchangeable moral fact which does not depend on the opinions of the speakers. A 
moral realist can certainly employ the minimalist notion of truth, but she would have 
to adopt a more substantial theory of facts or propositions in order to keep the 
evidence-independent objectivity solid in her realism. I argue that one of the ways to 
supplement minimalism is to accept truthmaker theory.  
 
2.3.3 Correspondence Theory of truth is also Not Good Enough 
If minimalism about truth is not good enough by itself for moral realism, what 
other truth theories are available? Of course, many theories have been developed to 
explain the nature of truth.29 Out of these theories, the correspondence theory of 
truth seems to be the next runner up for moral realism. The correspondence theory 
 
28 For example, Field (1994), too, draws connections from deflationism to vagueness, indeterminacy, and non-
factual discourse such as normative and evaluative discourse. 
29 It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a survey of these theories. For this see Scharp (2013: 13-15). 
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of truth, which takes truth to be corresponding to reality, is most popular and has 
been widely accepted.  
It is easy to draw connections between realism and the correspondence theory 
of truth. Given (M) and (S2), moral realists have reasons to endorse the 
correspondence theory of truth: there are moral facts in the world, and the moral 
sentences that are true correspond with the facts. The correspondence truth is 
commonly associated with a form of realism because the correspondence relation 
between propositions with the objective reality satisfactorily determines truth. 30 
Given that there are evidence-independent, objective moral facts in the world, the 
propositions that correspond to the objective world are assigned of true truth-values. 
In fact, we can find moral realists who make this move. Enoch (2011) endorses 
“a pre-established harmony” which is responsible for correlating moral facts to 
moral beliefs. For example, there is a moral fact that survival is good: we develop 
moral beliefs corresponding to what is good because evolution is directed to survival 
(169). The fact that survival is good pre-establishes the harmony between normative 
truths and normative beliefs. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) claim that moral 
sentences are true when they correspond to moral fixed points, a battery of 
substantive moral propositions that are non-naturalistic conceptual truths. 
However, the correspondence theory of truth does not seem to do the job that 
the realists want it to do. The correspondence notion is too platitudinous so that even 
the enemies of the correspondence truth accept the notion of truth as corresponding 
to facts.31 There is nothing substantial about the claim that truth corresponds with 
the facts. The corresponding relation is trivial and vacuous that there is no 
theoretical weight behind it (Blackburn 1984). If almost everyone accepts such a 
platitude about truths, correspondence truth theorists would have to claim 
something more substantial. The correspondence notion of truth seems to be no 
 
30 According to Devitt (1991:42), “Sentences of type x are true or false in virtue of (1) their structure, (2) the 
referential relations between their parts and reality, (3) the objective and mind-independent nature of that 
reality.” 
31 For example, Blackburn, Horwich, Grover, Wright, and Hill all agree that truth corresponds to reality: truth is 
platitudinous. 
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different from the deflationary notion of truth: e.g. “It is true that snow is white iff 
snow is white.” 
Is there a way to bring in a more substantial notion of truth without saying 
something tautological such as “truths are true because they are true”? Dummett 
(1958: 157) gives us a hint:  
the correspondence theory expresses one important feature of the 
concept of truth which is not expressed by the law “It is true that p if and 
only if p” and which we have so far left quite out of account: that a 
statement is true only if there is something in the world in virtue of 
which it is true. 
The correspondence relation should be substituted with a more substantial relation: 
facts are the objects in virtue of which truths are true. I argue that the relation that 
is captured by ‘in virtue of’ should imply truths as carrying ontological and 
metaphysical commitments (Asay 2011: 108). If one’s a realist, then the intuition that 
lies behind the notion of truth must be grounded in the world itself, not to the 
correspondence relation, but to the existence of worldly facts and objects, namely 
truthmakers. 
 
2.3.4 Truthmakers for Moral Realism 
Since I have shown that a minimalist notion of truth or the correspondence 
notion of truth is not good enough for doing the job that the realists want truth to do, 
I need to provide a better option for realists. I suggest a truthmaking theory, 
accepting Asay’s (2013) proposal. This move will later be useful for explaining 
metaphysical indeterminacy in metaethics.  
In virtue of what is some truth true? As a branch of metaphysics, truthmaker 
theory offers truthmakers for making the truths true. Truth depends upon the 
existence of its truthmaker. The truth of a truth-bearer – whether it is a sentence, 
proposition, belief – is owed to something in the world. The truth of a sentence, 
“There are three peaches on the table,” is made true by the existence of three peaches 
24 
 
on this very table. If the truth-bearer is false, the world must have been different: 
there is one apple or two peaches on the table instead. The sentence is true because 
of the truthmakers in the world. Such a truthmaking relation is a grounding relation: 
truthmakers are ontologically responsible for the truths. 
According to Devitt (1991) and Asay (2013), realism is strictly a metaphysical 
position. For Asay, “moral realism is about moral reality, and reality is the domain 
of metaphysics” (219). Suggesting (M), I take realism to be the ontological thesis 
about the existence of an evidence-independent world, not whether a moral sentence 
is true or false, or whether we have epistemic access to moral truths. If one construes 
moral realism with the semantic thesis such as “moral sentences are truth-apt”, then 
it is putting the semantic or epistemological cart before the metaphysics horse, as 
Michael Devitt (1991) claims. For moral realists, the ontological basis for moral 
truths is mind-independent moral facts and properties. Moral truths depend on the 
existence of mind-independent moral facts and properties. Therefore, it seems 
important for moral realists to define moral facts with a metaphysically heavy notion 
– with truthmakers. 
According to Asay, “there is the linguistic conception of facts as truths, and the 
metaphysical conception of facts as truthmakers” (220). While anti-realists and 
realists can agree that there are the linguistic conceptions of facts as truths, realists 
must go a step further and say that truthmakers are needed to make true to the 
linguistic facts as truths. While anti-realists are committed to the linguistic 
conception of facts, realists should be committed to the metaphysical conception of 
facts as truthmakers. 
There can be many ways to adhere to different types of truthmakers.32 Moral 
realists can adopt a metaphysical sense of facts, which are compound or structured 
entities, which would be suitable for truthmaking. According to David Armstrong 
(1997), facts are called ‘states of affairs.’ Facts are non-mereological compounds of 
 
32 For example, one can adhere to the Armstrong (1997)’s theory of truthmaking that makes use of facts or states 
of affairs, or take tropes as candidate for truthmakers (e.g., Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984) 
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universals and particulars. ‘a is F’ is true when some particular a instantiates the 
universal F. If a particular a instantiates a universal F, the fact ‘a is F’ exists. 
Otherwise, it does not. Likewise, moral facts would be composed of particulars and 
universals. In every possible world, if there is some object a (the particular) which 
instantiates the property goodness (the universal), then a will be good. These 
universals – the moral properties – are combined with the particulars to compose 
facts – the states of affairs. Such facts can be adequate truthmakers for robust moral 
realism: moral facts are true in virtue of truthmakers. 
Rejecting Armstrong’s notion of states of affairs, moral realists can instead 
exclusively commit themselves to metaphysical moral properties instead of moral 
facts, just as Dunaway (2016) and Jonathan Dancy and Christopher Hookway (1986) 
do. Metaphysically robust moral properties (Dunaway calls them ‘elite’ properties) 
can be a proper ontological ground for moral claims. One can think of moral 
properties as tropes, ontologically unstructured abstract particulars, which can serve 
as truthmakers for moral predications.33 
It is not the scope of my paper to examine whether explaining moral properties 
with tropes or moral facts with the states of affairs is better. I am not claiming that 
adhering to either of these views is without problems.34 All I am claiming is that 
moral realists should accept the existence of moral facts or properties which are 
metaphysically heavy-weighted so that it can provide the ontological ground for 
moral truth: they are truthmakers.35 In virtue of existence of such properties and 
facts, moral truths become true.36  
 
33 D. C. Williams (1953) first suggested that tropes are the bearers of final moral value: to claim that what we 
value are the particular properties of things – tropes – is prima facie intuitive. Campbell (1981) also thought that 
tropes are especially suited for serving the purpose for being value-bearers. 
34  Against Armstrong, Lewis (1992) has denied that there is room for non-mereological composition. For 
discussion, see McDaniel (2009). Against trope theory, see Stjernberg (2003). 
35 This is similar to Schaffer's (2010) view of truthmaking: x is a truthmaker for y if and only if x grounds the 
truth of y. 
36 Fabrice Correia (2014) identifies truth-making with grounding. If Correia also accepts fundamentality-based 
conception of grounding, there is an option of accepting both a gradated view of reality and truth-making thesis. 
Thanks to Dos Dosky for pointing this out. 
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Asay (2011) argues that truthmaker theory is a better theory for motivating 
realism than a correspondence theory of truth. One of the advantages of truthmaker 
theory is that the truthmaking relation can be one-many or many-many while the 
correspondence relation is strictly one-one. 37  According to the correspondence 
theorist, the world is composed of facts which come in various shades: positive, 
negative, existential, ethical, aesthetic, counterfactual, etc. A distinct single fact has 
a correspondence relation to a truth. While a correspondence relation requires a 
distinct kind of fact for its truth, in a truthmaker theory anything can be (and 
everything is) a truthmaker: facts, properties, objects, etc. According to Asay (2011: 
113), “Take any existing entity x: x is a truthmaker for the truth that x exists.” Since 
the world is a world of truthmakers, truthmaker theories are more flexible in 
accommodating the correspondence intuition. The truthmaking theory would better 
motivate moral realists’ tenets since moral realists claim that not only do moral facts 
exist, but also properties. Since properties can be truthmakers for moral truths, 
moral realists can happily adopt truthmaker theory over the correspondence theory 
of truth for substantially grounding their truths.38  
One of the objections that I could expect is that, just as I treated the 
correspondence relation as trivial, one might treat the truthmaking relation as trivial 
too. To some, there seems to be no difference between the correspondence relation 
and truthmaking relation. Both describe the relation between how the world gets 
represented. I argue that the truthmaking relation is more substantial and 
fundamental than the correspondence relation because the truthmaking relation is 
a robust asymmetric relation: it is what grounds the truth (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005: 
19-19). Being metaphysically primitive, the truthmaking relation explains how moral 
 
37 Of course, there are many other advantages of preferring truthmaker theory over a correspondence theory of 
truth. See Asay (2011: 102-120). 
38  If my argument holds, it gives a reason to prefer Barnes’s account of ontic indeterminacy over J. R. G. 
Williams's (2008a) because his account takes the correspondence relation to play a key role in his indeterminate 
possible worlds account. 
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truths are true in virtue of truthmakers. 39  Therefore, we can add a new 
supplementary tenet regarding truth (T): 
(T) Moral truths are made true in virtue of truthmakers. 40 
 
2.4 Recap 
To recap, here are the tenets for minimal moral realism: 
(M) OBJECTIVITY: There are moral facts in the world. 
(S1) COGNITIVISM: Moral sentences are truth-apt. 
(S2) NO ERROR THEORY: Some moral sentences are true. 
Here are the supplementary tenets:  
(L1) BIVALENCE: For all sentences in the moral domain, they are 
either true or false. 
(L2) LAW OF EXCLUDED MIDDLE: For any moral sentence p, either p 
or not p. 
(T) TRUTHMAKERS: Moral truths are made true in virtue of truthmakers. 
When all of these tenets are accepted as constituting moral realism, then it is 
easy to argue that indeterminacy is compatible with moral realism. It is just classical 
logic – (L1) and (L2) - that appears to cause problems to indeterminacy. How so? 
Think about the lucky penny case again. Picking up a lucky penny on the street is 
permissible. However, picking up a duffle bag full of cash is impermissible. Then is 
picking up a fifty-pound note on the street permissible? It’s hard to tell. It seems like 
it is indeterminate as to whether or not it is permissible. However, a moral realist 
cannot allow for indeterminacy. (L1) says, “Picking up a fifty-pound note on the 
street is permissible” should be either true or false, not indeterminate. How can a 
 
39 To see how the grounding relation and truthmaking relation connect up together, see Jonathan Schaffer 
(2008). 
40 This is to adopt Asay's (2011) methodological maximalism about truthmakers. It “does not outright assume 
the bold metaphysical thesis that all truths have truthmakers, but instead is open to the possibility that there are 
truthmaker gaps (even beyond analytic truths)” (59). 
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moral realist explain such indeterminacy while retaining classical logic? Before I 
explain how so, I want to explain what indeterminacy is and with what kind of moral 
indeterminacy I am concerned in chapter 3. 
 
 
3. Three Types of Indeterminacy and Moral Indeterminacy 
In metaethics, moral indeterminacy has been receiving a lot of attention these 
days. These debates especially focus on agents making rational decisions when there 
is moral uncertainty (Dunaway 2017, Dougherty 2016, J. R. G. Williams 2016) and 
on value incommensurability and comparability (Broome 1997, Chang 2016, 
Andersson 2016). In this chapter, I explain these moral indeterminacies in terms of 
semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic indeterminacy, following the standard way of 
classifying vagueness. 
It is important to explain how each type of indeterminacy affects moral 
indeterminacy for two reasons. First, it is because each type of indeterminacy has its 
own place in moral indeterminacy. It is not the case that all moral indeterminacy is 
reducible to semantic, metaphysical, or epistemic indeterminacy. 41  Some moral 
indeterminacy is semantic; some moral indeterminacy is metaphysical; some moral 
indeterminacy is epistemic.42 When we classify moral indeterminacy into semantic, 
metaphysical, and epistemic indeterminacy, we better understand the structure of 
moral indeterminacy affecting moral disagreement in distinctive ways. I will come 
back to talking about moral disagreement in chapter 5. 
Second, it is important because distinguishing three types of indeterminacy 
allows me to suggest a version of moral realism that is compatible with such 
 
41 For example, Schoenfield (2015) argues that all moral indeterminacy is metaphysical indeterminacy. Including 
Russell, many philosophers have argued that vagueness is purely a semantic phenomenon. 
42 Notice the contrast here that in the vagueness literature, semantic vagueness is accepted as a standard position 
while epistemicism is considered incredulous (Keefe and Smith 1996: 18), and ontic vagueness is judged 
unintelligible (Dummett 1975: 314; Lewis 1986: 212). 
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indeterminacies. I will come back to such suggestions in chapter 4. In this chapter, I 
focus on introducing three types of indeterminacy and how moral indeterminacy 
relates to each type of indeterminacy. 
As I have shown in chapter 1, it is easy to just give an example of moral 
indeterminacy. I used an example of picking up five pounds off the ground and an 
example of sharing a wine bottle with a friend. Dunaway (2017) uses an example of 
killing an amoeba (and going through an evolutionary chain of creatures) to save a 
person. Dougherty (2016) gives an example of abortion (when does a zygote become 
a person?) and late party (when is it too late to hold a noisy party?). Providing these 
examples of moral indeterminacy is good for pumping our intuitions; we can see 
straight away that there are morally indeterminate cases. However, looking at the 
examples of moral indeterminacy can only scratch the surface of the phenomenon. 
Therefore, I examine what semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic indeterminacies 
are and how moral indeterminacy relates to each type of indeterminacy. Then I argue 
that moral realism is compatible with semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic moral 
indeterminacy. 
In §3.1, I divide up the structure of indeterminacy into names/objects-
indeterminacy, predicates/properties-indeterminacy, and sentences/states of 
affairs-indeterminacy. I argue that the core phenomenon of indeterminacy lies in 
indeterminacy in a multiple range of reference application. In §3.2, I list different 
types of semantic indeterminacy related to contextualism and vagueness to describe 
what semantic moral indeterminacy looks like. In §3.3, I describe what metaphysical 
indeterminacy is, especially related to states of affairs, and explain what 
metaphysical moral indeterminacy looks like. In §3.4, I introduce epistemicism and 
explain what epistemic moral indeterminacy looks like. Based on the analysis of this 
chapter, I suggest a way for moral realists to explain each type of indeterminacy in 
chapter 4. 
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3.1 Dividing up the structure of Indeterminacy 
What is indeterminacy?43 Indeterminacy is, roughly put, that out of the available 
alternatives that could hold, there is no fact of the matter that holds determinately.44 
In philosophy, indeterminacy is prevalent. To give a familiar example, in philosophy 
of time, the idea of open future holds that the propositions about the future are 
indeterminate (whereas the propositions about the past are unchanging, fixed, or 
closed). Aristotle’s famous future contingent sentence, “There will be a sea-battle 
tomorrow”, does not seem to be true or false. If the sentence is true, on what grounds 
is the sentence true when the future event has not taken place yet? If the sentence is 
false, how are we sure that we blocked all the possibilities that lead to the sea-battle 
tomorrow (Øhrstrøm and Hasle 2015)? In philosophy of language, Quine talks about 
indeterminacy in translation, asking whether there is a single, determinate way of 
translating a language when there are many equally correct ways to translate. When 
a native speaker of the unknown language says ‘gavagai’ when he sees a rabbit, 
‘gavagai’ could mean lots of things. It could be a rabbit, a jumping rabbit, a rabbit’s 
leg, or many other things related or unrelated to the rabbit. Out of many possible 
meanings, it is indeterminate whether there is a unique translation of a word (Quine 
1960: 37).  
These examples tell us three important structures of indeterminacy in our 
language: sentence-indeterminacy, name-indeterminacy, and predicate-
indeterminacy. 45  The first example, open future, is concerned with sentence-
indeterminacy: the indeterminate truth-value of certain types of sentences, such as 
future contingent sentences. Should we still hold on to the principle of bivalence even 
if the future contingent sentences do not seem to have a truth-value, or adopting a 
‘truth-value gap’ approach, should we leave the truth-value empty for these 
 
43  Indeterminacy may be related to uncertainty, unquantifiability, unprovability, unpredictability, 
unobservability, or undecidability, but not equivalent to it. 
44 See Taylor (2018) for the minimal characterization of indeterminacy. On the other hand, according to Azzouni 
and Bueno (2008), it's surprisingly tricky to pin down what there being no fact of the matter about something 
really amounts to. 
45 Hyde (2008) divides up vagueness into name-vagueness, predicate-vagueness, and sentence-vagueness. I 
divide up indeterminacy likewise in parallel. 
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sentences? If a future contingent sentence fails to be true or false, can we assign a 
third truth-value, ‘1/2’ or ‘i’ which stands for indeterminacy? Commonly, sentence-
indeterminacy is understood as a violation of the principle of bivalence. If a sentence 
fails to be true or false, then the truth-value of the sentence is indeterminate.46 
The second example, indeterminacy in translation, hints us towards name-
indeterminacy and predicate-indeterminacy. Indeterminacy of translation is 
concerned with the parts of the sentences, such as singular terms and predicates. Is 
there a definite reference to which the singular term ‘gavagai’ refer? Or is the term 
‘gavagai’ not precisely defined enough to pick out the unique reference in the world?  
According to Frege (as construed by Dummett (2006: 47)), the principle of 
bivalence is violated by the two features of natural language: predicate-
indeterminacy and name-indeterminacy. First, predicate-indeterminacy: there are 
predicates that are not well defined, or not defined at all, for every object. For 
example, “Edinburgh is crowded” fails to be true or false because the predicate, ‘is 
crowded’, is not well defined. To see what counts as ‘being crowded’, do we have to 
consider the number of people who live in Edinburgh now, or should we count the 
travellers and visitors in certain seasons as well? Or should we check if the 
pavements in Edinburgh are usually occupied with pedestrians? There are many 
ways to define a predicate, and it is unclear which definition holds.47 Even if some 
predicates might have clear definitions, they might lack precise application 
conditions (Raffman 2014: 96), leaving the predicate indeterminate. Vague terms 
such as ‘rich’, ‘tall’, ‘bald’, ‘red’ are such examples. If there are sentences that contain 
these predicates, they fail to be true or false.  
Moral terms also exhibit predicate-indeterminacy. Consider ‘courageous.’ 
Such a term exhibits predicate-indeterminacy because, as we have seen above, it is 
not well-defined. To define it roughly, to be courageous is to face danger or risk 
 
46 One can call it truth-value gap, too. Shaw (2014: 504) lists several causes of truth-value gaps: “indicative 
conditionals, with false antecedents, semantic anomaly, non-referring definites and strong presupposition 
failures more generally, non-referring names.” 
47 I will elaborate more on this issue in §3.2. 
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bravely. Then what counts as facing danger or taking a risk bravely? Again, we can 
ask what it means to face danger bravely. Even if we found a clear definition for 
‘courageous’, it could also lack precise application conditions. What is the necessary 
and sufficient condition for applying the term, ‘courageous’, to a person or to an 
action? Indeterminacy in moral predicates concerns the type of reference-
indeterminacy: there seem to be no clear application conditions of moral terms.48 
The second way of violating the principle of bivalence is through name-
indeterminacy. There are singular terms that do not denote objects because there 
are no objects to refer to. For example, a definite description, such as ‘the centre of 
the universe’, fails to denote any object even though we all understand the meaning 
of the term. Proper names, such as ‘Atlantis’, also fail to denote an object. Therefore, 
a sentence like “There were many rivers on Atlantis” or “There were many rivers on 
the lost continent” is neither true nor false because there is no object denoted by the 
name ‘Atlantis’ or the definite description ‘the lost continent’.  
However, singular terms also fail to denote objects, not because there are none, 
but because there are too many objects to choose from.49 While there is no object to 
which ‘the lost continent’ refer, there are too many objects to which ‘the smartest 
person in school’ or ‘the greatest philosopher’ refers. In this case, “Kant is the 
greatest philosopher” fails to be true or false. Whereas there is no object to which 
‘Atlantis’ refers, there is no single object to which ‘Edinburgh’ refers because there 
are many ways to draw the boundary of Edinburgh. 50  If I am standing on the 
boundary of Edinburgh, “I am in Edinburgh” fails to be true or false. 
Another example is from Taylor and Burgess (2015: 298). When one says that it 
is semantically indeterminate whether Kilimanjaro contains more than n molecules, 
the name ‘Kilimanjaro’ fails to pick out a unique, mountain-shaped composite of 
 
48 Shafer-Landau (1994: 334) refers to it as conceptual vagueness because many moral concepts are fuzzy around 
the edges, lacking “precise definitional criteria and so incompletely fix their extension.” 
49
 Whether there can be a singular moral term remains unknown. Is ‘justice’ a singular term? 
50 Similarly, consider a 10-pound cat, Tibbles. If there is 9-pound part of Tibbles, which consists of all of Tibbles 
but his tail, is he still Tibbles? This is a well-known problem in metaphysics, known as mereological essentialism 
(Burke 1996). 
33 
 
molecules. Rather, there are many mountain-shaped composites of molecules. This 
would be an example of indeterminacy in picking out one correct reference for the 
term. 
So far, I have listed some structures of indeterminacy that occur in our language: 
sentence-indeterminacy, name-indeterminacy, and predicate-indeterminacy.51 Also, 
I pointed out that the essential feature of indeterminacy in our language is 
indeterminacy in reference.52 The reference of the sentence, name, or predicate is 
indeterminate in a way that either there is no reference or there are too many 
references that a term could refer to.53 This division will help us compare semantic 
indeterminacy with metaphysical indeterminacy in §3.3: Name-indeterminacy 
corresponds to object-indeterminacy, predicate-indeterminacy to property-
indeterminacy, and sentence-indeterminacy to states-of-affairs-indeterminacy. 
Before I explain metaphysical indeterminacy in §3.3, more needs to be said about 
types of semantic indeterminacy in language, especially related to vagueness and 
Sorites. I explain what semantic indeterminacy is in §3.2. I will talk about epistemic 
indeterminacy in §3.4. 
 
3.2 Semantic Indeterminacy 
In this section, I introduce different types of semantic indeterminacy and show 
how some moral terms are semantically indeterminate. Semantic indeterminacy is 
prevalent, maybe too prevalent. It lies as an undeniable characteristic of the 
representational feature of our language. Borrowing words from Bertrand Russell 
(1923: 89), indeterminacy in our language can be compared to a smudged 
photograph. Our words attempt to represent how the world is, but they are too 
 
51 Fine (1975: 267) thinks that all vagueness can be reduced to predicate-vagueness. Keefe (2000: 14) thinks that 
primary bearer of vagueness should be sentences. I don’t side with either of them. 
52 The same explanation applies to indeterminacy in moral language. Regarding what is meant by the question 
of what one ought to do about this or that, Wiggins says “indeterminacy or underdetermination is revealed in the 
reference and extension of certain moral words or in certain combinations of them” (Wiggins 1990: 77). 
53 Such a characterization is to agree with Raffman (2014)’s Multiple Range Theory of Vagueness. 
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coarse-grained to accurately describe how the world actually is. These words fail to 
pick out the references that they represent. 
As Schroeder (2012) points out, if one is a metaethicist, she would want to 
understand how moral language works because she would want to discover how 
ordinary speakers manage to successfully talk about moral facts and properties.54 
Particularly, moral realists should be more interested in the theory of reference – 
metasemantics – because they are interested in not only “how people could succeed 
at talking about the same thing as one another, even while having very different ideas 
about the extension of those terms” (707), but also how the truth-value of the moral 
sentences is determined from objective moral reality. Therefore, many metaethicists 
would want to understand how semantic indeterminacy works, which could be a 
helpful tool explaining why people succeed or fail to communicate moral concepts to 
each other.  
Of course, moral realists can simply deny semantic indeterminacy: moral 
language is, in fact, semantically determinate. This move is, indeed, what many 
moral realists make when they face semantic indeterminacy. 55 Commonly, moral 
realists accept reference magnetism to explain away semantic indeterminacy. 56 
According to reference magnetism, moral properties causally act as reference 
 
54 There have been attempts to understand moral semantics. There are two ways to divide up moral terms: 
thick/thin or evaluative/normative. The former division is first adopted by B. Williams (1985) and endorsed by 
Väyrynen (2011) and Roberts (2013). Thin terms include ‘right’, ‘good’, ‘wrong’, ‘bad’, ‘permissible’, and ‘ought’. 
These terms are called ‘thin’ because they are purely evaluative. On the other hand, thick terms include ‘pious’, 
‘courageous’, ‘shrewd’, ‘selfish’, ‘gullible’ and more; they are called ‘thick’ because evaluative and non-evaluative 
descriptions are both included in thick terms. For example, being pious is not only religiously evaluated as 
something good, but also a description of one’s faithfulness and dedication. The combination of both evaluative 
and non-evaluative description makes a term ‘thick.’  
Another way of dividing up moral terms is to separate evaluative terms from normative terms. Such division is 
endorsed by Plunkett and Sundell (2013), Tappolet (2014), and Chrisman (2018). Evaluative terms include ‘good’, 
‘bad’, ‘admirable’, and ‘fair’; normative or deontic terms include ‘ought’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, and ‘permissible’. 
According to Tappolet (2014), the one of the differences between evaluative terms and normative terms is that 
evaluative terms can take comparative and superlative forms, whereas normative terms do not admit degrees. 
Tappolet explains that it is because normative terms apply to actions – that you can either perform an action or 
not perform an action - whereas evaluative terms can be applied to range of things - objects, persons, actions, 
and states of affairs. Normative terms apply to what is subject to the will of the agent, which is the action, whereas 
evaluative terms cover more than actions. 
55  Another move that realists can take is to develop ‘conceptual role semantics’ where vague predicates 
determinately refer to whatever relation which makes certain rules of inference for practical reason valid 
(Wedgwood 2001). I am not considering this view in my thesis. Schoenfield argues that it is still not rigid enough 
and it falls back to ontic indeterminacy. See Schoenfield (2015: 271-276). 
56 For example, see Dunaway and McPherson (2016). 
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magnets.57 Certain properties are better candidates for the reference of our terms 
than others. The magnetic pull of this property attracts the reference of the word 
across a variety of usage patterns. Although learning the referent of ‘permissible’ 
through the usage in our linguistic community would tell us what is morally 
permissible, it is guided by the magnetic pull of moral properties. Learning the 
referents of moral terms from language usage also involves learning the 
metaphysically privileged referents of moral terms. Therefore, there is no need for 
moral realists to endorse semantic indeterminacy if reference magnetism is true.  
However, there are many reasons to reject reference magnetism if one is a moral 
realist. First, a non-naturalist moral realist, such as Enoch (2011: 101), would deny 
that moral properties are causally efficacious. Moral facts and properties do not have 
any causal effect on us or our language, just as abstract objects like numbers do not 
have any causal power over and above us. Second, even if there are metaphysically 
privileged properties, it is doubtful how this ‘pull’ works. It seems rather magical that 
moral properties have such a magnetic power to control certain language usage. 
Therefore, in this section, I develop my arguments based on the assumption that 
moral realists would want to explain semantic indeterminacy because they 
acknowledge the fact that semantic indeterminacy is prevalent. 
I will first lay out the types of semantic indeterminacy and then show how moral 
terms and sentences fit into these types of semantic indeterminacy. The scope of my 
research is going to be limited only to moral sentences with quantifiers. A moral 
sentence is a sentence consisting of one or more moral terms. For example, a moral 
sentence such as “abortion is wrong” will be read as “all murder is wrong” or “some 
murder is wrong”. In other words, I will not treat these moral sentences as generic 
statements, such as “In general, murder is wrong.” 
In this section, I explain different types of semantic indeterminacy: context-
sensitivity, spectrum vagueness, and multidimensional vagueness. I examine these 
 
57 Reference Magnetism is suggested by David Lewis: assignment of contents to expressions of our language is 
fixed to “the ones that respect the objective joints in nature” (1984: 227). 
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because they retain classical logic and can be compatible with moral realism. I do not 
endorse any non-classical treatment of indeterminacy or vagueness – 
supervaluationism or three-valued logic – because I have argued in chapter 2 that 
moral realism should be, by default, compatible with classical logic.58 I will then 
argue that, in chapter 4, moral realists are able to explain semantic indeterminacy 
using Raffman (2014)’s Multiple Range Theory of vagueness. 
 
3.2.1 Context-Sensitivity 
In this section, I introduce context-sensitivity and explain how useful it is for 
metaethicists to explain semantic indeterminacy. I argue that, even though context-
sensitivity is useful, moral realists cannot rely on context-sensitivity only. Shapiro 
(2013: 307) correctly points out that just about every theorist holds that vague terms 
are context-sensitive in a way. Without a given context, the reference of a term or a 
sentence is indeterminate. Since the reference cannot be determined without the 
context that the word or sentence is used, the references of the vague terms, such as 
‘rich’, ‘tall’, ‘red’, are indeterminate when these terms are used without context. 
Imagine that you overheard somebody saying, “Hana is tall.” Is she tall, compared to 
kindergarteners? Is she tall compared to the speaker? Or is she tall, compared to 
basketball players? It is indeterminate what ‘tall’ refers to when the relevant context 
is not given. 
 
58 One can adopt many other non-classical alternatives to assign truth-values to vague sentences. There is a truth-
value glut if a borderline predication is both true and false. There is a truth-value gap if a borderline predication 
fails to be determinately true or false. Accepting Fine (1975)’s supervaluationism, one can still say that the 
classical tautology, “either x is F or x is not F”, is determinately true even if it’s not the case that “x is F” is 
determinately true, nor is it the case that “x is F” is determinately true. Think of all the uncontentious cases of “x 
is F.” “x is F” is true if it comes out true on all the ways in which we can make the vague predicate “F” precise. A 
borderline case of “x is F” will neither be true nor false because it is true in only some of the ways of making “F” 
precise and false on others. However, the form “either x is F or x is not F” will still be true no matter what because 
it will be true whenever a sharp boundary for F is drawn (Keefe and Smith 1996: 7). Many-valued logic is another 
option: vague sentences can have more than three-values, such as the true, the false and the indeterminate 
(Edgington 1997, Tye 1994). One can alternatively adopt degree theories of truth that a borderline predicate can 
take a whole spectrum of values between 0 and 1 (N. J. J. Smith 2008). My account is also against Stephen 
Schiffer (2002)’s account that there are no determinately true moral propositions. 
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The application of vague terms can be determined by, in part, shifting verbal 
dispositions of competent speakers (Raffman 1996). Depending on conversational 
goals, the interlocutors are free to apply or withhold the application of the vague term 
in borderline cases (Shapiro 2006: 10). Let’s assume that a speaker chooses to apply 
the term to a borderline case. If the interlocutor agrees with the speaker’s application 
of the term, then a new conversational context or conversational score is successfully 
established. 59  Both speakers agree that the borderline case is included in the 
extension of a term. Context-sensitivity is useful in explaining semantic 
indeterminacy because contextualists can say that there is no single context relative 
to which every usage of the vague terms is true.60 
In metaethics, there have been attempts to endorse contextualism to explain how 
moral language works. Metaethical contextualism is mainly advanced by Silk (2017) 
and Khoo and Knobe (2018). According to Discourse Contextualism, developed by 
Silk (2017), the participants of the normative discourse supply the body of norms. 
Silk calls us to imagine that Alice says to Bert, “Sally must give 10% of her income to 
the poor.” The truth-condition of Alice’s utterance is that her utterance is true 
because the norm that Alice endorses requires Alice to give 10% to the poor. If Bert 
disagrees with Alice, Bert endorses a different norm than Alice does. Here, 
disagreement between Alice and Bert is not about which set of norms is true. Rather, 
disagreement concerns which moral norms are “operative in the context” (222). If 
Alice and Bert carry on the conversation to reach an agreement, they are engaging in 
a metalinguistic negotiation to decide which norms are appropriate for the context 
to accept.61  
Likewise, Khoo and Knobe (2018) develops a version of metaethical 
contextualism where the truth-condition of an utterance depends on whether 
interlocutor of the moral discourse accepts or rejects the value that the speaker 
 
59 Shapiro uses David Lewis’s notion of conversational score. 
60 It is also to be noted that indeterminacy can remain still even after such contextual factors, such as comparison 
class and paradigm cases, are fixed.  
61 Proponents of the view that normative disagreement is metalinguistic in nature are Plunkett and Sundell (2013) 
and Ludlow (2014). 
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proposes.62 For example, if a divine command theorist says, “abortion is wrong”, the 
utterance is true only when the interlocutor agrees with the utterance. It is because, 
by agreeing with the utterance, the interlocutor sets the salient norm of the discourse 
as the divine command theory. If the norm is not established between the 
participants, the utterances in that discourse will be indeterminate as there will be 
no truth-conditions that determine the truth value of the utterances.  
Even though context-sensitivity appears to explain semantic indeterminacy, 
context-sensitivity, only by itself, is not a good enough option for moral realists to 
endorse to explain semantic indeterminacy. Truth in moral realism is grounded by 
evidence-independency. Whether an utterance is true in a moral discourse should 
not completely depend on whether the interlocutors accept the given norm or not. 
Rather, the truth is determined by objective moral reality. Of course, a context in 
part determines the meaning and the reference of moral terms. However, context 
only plays a contingent role for moral realism because the norm of the moral 
discourse cannot, by itself, determine moral truth. 
Schoenfield (2015) makes a similar point that moral realists cannot be 
contextualists. According to Schoenfield (2015), if moral realists accept what she 
calls the “shifty view” (namely, contextualism) to explain semantic indeterminacy, 
they are in trouble. The shifty view claims that the meaning of this vague predicate, 
‘is morally permissible’, is shifty, depending on the context. The truth-value of the 
utterance “φ is morally permissible” is context-sensitive because what is morally 
permissible or not changes, depending on the moral culture and language of the 
community. There are too many permissible linguistic conventions governing the 
correct application conditions of moral predicates, which could vary from one 
linguistic community to another. How can we settle the criteria of correct application 
conditions for every moral predicate in different linguistic contexts? The 
community’s usage of language makes the moral truth contingent. If the community 
 
62  Their version of contextualism is based on Harman (1975)’s moral group relativism. Dreier (2009) also 
advocates a form contextualism: speaker relativism. 
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changes its usage, the truth will change, too. Therefore, moral realists would want to 
claim that the absolute truth value of “φ is morally permissible” does not depend on 
the community’s language usage. Schoenfield thinks that adhering to the shifty view 
is not compatible with the tenet, (M) OBJECTIVITY. Regarding moral matters, 
deliberation 63  – such as weighing reasons, examining justification, assessing 
intention, and considering moral principles – is more important than looking into 
language usage (Schoenfield 2015: 265).  
I think context plays some role in determining the reference of moral terms. 
Metaethical contextualists are not completely wrong, but Schoenfield is not 
completely right, either. It’s not a matter of all-or-nothing. Moral realists cannot just 
be contextualists, but they should appeal to contextualism only partially. I will 
explain more on this topic in chapter 4 that moral indeterminacy is compared with 
the semantics of indexicals, which is partially context-sensitive. The character of 
indexicals determines the meaning of indexicals through its semantic rules, without 
determining the reference of indexicals. The reference is determined when a context 
is given. Similarly, context helps us to determine the reference of moral terms, but 
context, by itself, cannot determine the truth-value of moral sentences.64 
 
3.2.2 Vagueness as Referential Indeterminacy 
Why do we need to understand what vagueness is when the topic of my thesis is 
indeterminacy? It is because, I think, vagueness is a phenomenon that reflects 
referential indeterminacy. In this section, I aim to achieve two things. First, I explain 
what spectrum vagueness and multidimensional vagueness are. Second, I show that, 
in metaethics, semantic indeterminacy is more related to multidimensional 
vagueness than spectrum vagueness.  
 
63  Moral deliberation is also emphasized by Enoch (2011: 72) as well that it is rationally non-optional for 
discovering normative truths. 
64 This is the position that Dreier (1990) defends. Thank you, Justin Snedegar, for pointing this out.  
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One of the traditions in vagueness literature is that many philosophers explain 
vagueness as a feature of a semantic phenomenon that reflects some kind of 
indeterminacy.65 Vagueness is often characterized as having borderline cases, where 
it is indeterminate whether the vague predicates, such as “bald”, “tall”, “heap”, or 
“child”, applies to the subjects or not (Keefe 2000: 6).66 Here’s an example. Hana is 
borderline tall. Hana is not as tall as average basketball players who are, usually, over 
6 feet. Hana is not as short as 5 feet, either. She’s in the middle – approximately 5 
feet 6 inches. Then the sentence, “Hana is tall”, seems to have no fact of the matter 
whether the predicate, “tall”, applies to Hana or not. Then it is indeterminate 
whether Hana is tall. In other words, the truth-value of the sentence, “Hana is tall”, 
is indeterminate. It is indeterminate whether “Hana is tall” is true or false. Some say 
that it might be violating the principle of bivalence because the truth-value of “Hana 
is tall” appears to be neither true nor false. Furthermore, the law of excluded middle 
seems to be violated as well because “Hana is tall” and “Hana is not tall” both cannot 
be held at the same time.  
These examples are typically classified as spectrum vagueness, also known as 
soritical, linear, or degree vagueness. ‘Tall’ is associated with a linear scale of height; 
‘Bald’ is associated with the number of hair, from 0 to 100,000, attached to one’s 
scalp. 67  It is called a spectrum or degree vagueness because there is a gradual 
difference in degree from the definite application of the term to the non-application 
of the term. There appears to be no precise boundary that divides the application of 
 
65 Of course, nowadays many philosophers argue that vagueness is also a metaphysical phenomenon; see Akiba 
(2004) and Hawley (2002). Metaphysical vagueness will be introduced in §3.3 in detail. 
66 Some philosophers say that incomplete predicates are indeterminate because incomplete predicates draw a 
sharp tripartite division (whereas vague predicates draw no sharp boundaries). An example of an incomplete 
predicate is from Sainsbury (1991): ‘child*’. ‘Child*’ applies to those who have not reached their sixteenth 
birthday and does not apply to those who have reached their eighteenth birthday. ‘Child*’ is not vague. It is 
precisely defined. To a seventeen-years-old, ‘child*’ fails to determinately apply or determinately not apply. The 
fact that there is a sharp tripartite division makes ‘child*’ an incomplete predicate which, in turn, makes the 
truth-value of the sentence “A 17-years-old is a child*” indeterminate. Another well-known example is Patrick 
Greenough's (2003: 246)’s “oldster”. Such examples can be continuously created by arbitrarily introducing new 
words. For example, Soames (1999: 164)’s ‘smidget’, Fine (1975: 120)’s ‘nice1’, Tappenden (1993: 556)’s ‘tung’, 
and N. J. J. Smith (2008: 133)’s ‘schort’. As Glanzberg (2004: 156) points out, it is unclear if there are any 
naturally occurring examples of predicates like this. 
67 Of course, how the patches of hair are shaped on the head can also be taken into consideration, but I will just 
follow the standard way of talking about baldness in vagueness. 
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the term and the non-application of the term. As the example shows above, ‘tall’ fails 
to draw a precise boundary between Hana being tall (the application of the term) and 
Hana not being tall (the non-application of the term). Spectrum vagueness is also 
known as linear vagueness because a line is given to represent a continuous gradient. 
In a linear colour spectrum, red gradually changes to orange (Figure 1).  
Of course, such a colour spectrum could vary in saturation (Figure 2) or 
brightness (Figure 3) as well.  
 
Therefore, colours can be vague along more than one linear spectrum. Whereas there 
is only one way for ‘tall’ to be vague (according to height), as the examples show 
Figure 1. From Red to Orange (Change in Hue) 
Figure 2. From Red to Dark Red (Change in Saturation) 
Figure 3. From Red to White (Change in Brightness) 
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above, there is more than one way for a colour to be vague. When there is more than 
one way to instantiate spectrum vagueness, the term reflects multidimensional or 
combinatory vagueness.  
Here is another term that exhibits multidimensional vagueness: ‘religion’ 
(Alston 1967: 219). Out of these nine criteria – (1) having beliefs in supernatural 
beings, (2) demarcation of sacred objects, (3) ritual acts, (4) moral codes, (5) a 
certain world view, (6) a way of life, (7) social organization, (8) forms of holy 
communication with supernatural beings, (9) and spiritual feelings – which of these, 
combined together, constitute necessary and sufficient condition for religion? Any of 
the combinations of the subsets could constitute a religion. Hinayana Buddhism 
lacks a belief in supernatural beings, but it is still a religion. Confucianism does not 
have a social organization, but it is still a religion. Therefore, it is indeterminate 
whether all or some of these criteria define a term. 
Even if the criteria are settled, there is one more problem. It is indeterminate 
whether each criterion applies to the correct reference.68 For instance, if religion 
must include some forms of holy communication with supernatural beings, praying 
must count as a form of holy communication. How about singing hymns, reciting 
holy scriptures, receiving revelations, and speaking in tongues? Maybe. Are there 
more actions that count as the forms of holy communication? Maybe. Is there an 
exhaustive list of the forms of holy communication? It seems indeterminate.  
 
68 This is what William Alston (1967: 220) pinpoints: “there is a variety of conditions, all of which have something 
to do with the application of a term. However, we are not able to make any sharp discriminations between those 
combinations of conditions which are sufficient or necessary for application.” 
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In sum, there are two main features of multidimensional vagueness. First, when 
there is more than one way for a term to be vague, it is indeterminate according to 
which criteria does a term apply to a term. Second, even if these criteria are settled, 
it is indeterminate whether each criterion applies to the correct reference. The 
difference between these two features is similar to the difference between vagueness 
of individuation and vagueness of application, which Alston (1967: 219) points out.69 
The vagueness of individuation is vagueness about where to draw the boundary of a 
fixed reference, whereas vagueness of application is vagueness about what counts or 
does not count as a correct reference. For example, ‘mountain’ exhibits vagueness of 
individuation when there are many ways to draw the boundary of a mountain (Quine 
1960: 126). Regarding its spatiotemporal regions, how big should the boundary of a 
mountain be? In other words, exactly from where does a mountain start and end 
(Figure 4)? 
 
On the other hand, ‘mountain’ exhibits vagueness of application when it is 
indeterminate to count something as a mountain or not. Looking at the tallest hill in 
the world, we might ask, “is this a mountain or not?” Looking at the smallest 
mountain in the world, we might ask “is this a mountain or not?” (Figure 5) 
 
69 This difference is better known as referential/attributive distinction in philosophy of language (Donnellan 
1966). 
Figure 4. Which one is the correct boundary of a mountain?  
(Vagueness of Individuation) 
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As the examples show above, a term exhibits multidimensional vagueness when 
(1) its criteria are indeterminate and (2) its application is indeterminate. I want to 
focus more on multidimensional vagueness than linear vagueness because 
multidimensional vagueness plays an important role in my treatment of semantic 
moral indeterminacy.  
Moral predicates exhibit more multidimensional vagueness than linear 
vagueness.70 First, there are many different criteria that constitute moral predicates71, 
and it might be indeterminate to decide on the exhaustive list of the correct criteria. 
For example, let’s say that the moral predicate, ‘being morally responsible’, is 
constituted with (a) rationality, (b) self-governance, and (c) capacity to act on the 
basis of moral considerations.72 However, the list is not exhaustive. We can keep 
adding more criteria, such as (d) being worthy of receiving a certain kind of reactive 
attitudes like praise and blame, (e) a causal connection between the action and its 
consequence for which the person is responsible, and more. For someone to be 
morally responsible, does she have to meet all the criteria above? If all apply but (d), 
is she still a morally responsible person? The answers to these questions are difficult 
to find because the criteria that constitute moral predicates are not permanently 
fixed. 
 
70 Constantinescu (2014) calls it imprecise gradability. Boyd (1988) calls it indeterminate cluster properties of 
borderline cases.  
71 Moral predicates “depend on the satisfaction of a number of distinct constitutive criteria for their instantiation” 
(Shafer-Landau 1995).  
72 An example from Tom Dougherty (2014). 
Figure 5. Which one is not a mountain?  
(Vagueness of Application) 
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Second, moral terms are applied to many references, may be too many. Consider 
a moral term, ‘cruelty’. Exhibiting the first feature of multidimensional vagueness, 
‘cruelty’ has many criteria. But let’s assume just for now that the correct criterion for 
‘cruelty’ is the ‘action that wilfully causes suffering to others’. Then one of the 
references that ‘cruelty’ might apply to is factory farming. Factory farming is 
arguably considered as cruel because it causes wilful suffering to cattle (or to any 
livestock) by confining them in small cages. Is it still cruel if they are let outside one 
day a week? If so, is it still cruel if they are let out outside two days a week? How 
about five or six days a week?73 Again, it is difficult to answer because some of the 
references to which the term applies might be wrong. 
To recap, multidimensional vagueness includes two levels of semantic 
indeterminacy. First, it is indeterminate which criteria apply to a term. One can say 
that the meaning of the term is indeterminate or even ambiguous.74 Second, even if 
certain criteria are settled, it is indeterminate whether a term refers to something – 
i.e. it is indeterminate whether that thing is the (or a) referent of the term. There are 
references to which a term definitely applies and the references to which the term 
does not definitely apply. In addition, there are references that are indeterminately 
applied by the term. Then is there a satisfactory semantics of multidimensionally 
vague moral terms for moral realists when there is semantic indeterminacy? The 
solution will be given in chapter 4. How does such semantics help moral realists 
explain moral disagreement? The answer will be given in chapter 5. 
 
 
 
73 If one is not convinced, the soritical argument can be divided with hourly increments. Is it cruel to cage the 
cattle just one hour a week? Two hours a week?  
74 For example, Raffman (2014: 107) points out that “soritical vagueness is an unclarity (here, multiplicity) in the 
reference of a term, whereas multidimensional vagueness is an unclarity in the stable content. Thus understood, 
multidimensional vagueness is a closer relative to ambiguity than to vagueness.” 
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3.3 Metaphysical Indeterminacy 
Metaphysical indeterminacy might be a little bit more difficult to understand 
than semantic indeterminacy. What does it mean when we say that the world is 
indeterminate? Unless you are familiar with quantum physics, you might easily think 
that the world is deterministic. Even if you are familiar with quantum physics, you 
might think that such indeterminacy only affects micro-atomic particles. The world 
is deterministic: adenosine triphosphate fuels the cells of every living organism; 
when you drop things, they always fall to the ground; the Earth goes around the Sun 
once in every 365.256 days; the laws of nature control the rest, so these laws 
nomically necessitate how the world is now and in the future. Even if you believe that 
the open-future thesis – the claim that how things will be in the future is currently 
unsettled – is true, you might still think that the present world is deterministic in 
such a way that every event is causally determined by antecedent events and 
conditions.  
It is easier to think that the there is little to no indeterminacy in the world. 
Therefore, many philosophers used to think that metaphysical indeterminacy is 
unintelligible (Dummett 1975: 314; Lewis 1986: 212). Nowadays, more and more 
philosophers start to find metaphysical indeterminacy intelligible. For example, 
Taylor and Burgess (2015), Akiba (2004), E. Barnes (2010), and J. R. G. Williams 
(2008b) are known to argue for coherency of metaphysical indeterminacy. 
According to Barnes (2014), “metaphysical indeterminacy is indeterminacy in how 
things are, rather than how they are described or what we know about them” (339). 
In other words, it is not just that there is, or may be, indeterminacy in our language 
or in our knowledge about the world. These philosophers say that, simply put, there 
is no fact of the matter.  
How should we understand what metaphysical indeterminacy is? It would be 
easier to draw on the divisions that I introduced in §3.1 and §3.2. In §3.1, I pointed 
out that name-indeterminacy corresponds to object-indeterminacy, predicate-
indeterminacy to property-indeterminacy, and sentence-indeterminacy to states-of-
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affairs-indeterminacy. Such correspondence relations are assumed because I assume 
that language represents the world, following Williamson (2005: 700). I assume that 
sentences represent the states of affairs, names represent objects, and predicates 
represent properties. Worldly indeterminacy means, therefore, indeterminacy in 
objects, properties, or states of affairs. 
In this section, I aim to achieve three goals. First, I introduce what metaphysical 
indeterminacy is. Second, I explain how metaethics incorporates metaphysical 
indeterminacy into some of the discussions regarding value comparisons. Lastly, 
using Shafer-Landau’s example, I explain how classical logic does not seem to be 
compatible with metaphysical indeterminacy. These three goals are needed because, 
only after we understand how realists treat metaphysical indeterminacy, I can argue 
that the kind of moral realism, which I introduced in chapter 2, is compatible with 
metaphysical indeterminacy in chapter 4. 
 
3.3.1 What is Metaphysical Indeterminacy? 
In this subsection, I introduce object-indeterminacy, property-indeterminacy, 
and states-of-affairs indeterminacy. Then I explain how these types of indeterminacy 
ambiguate the moral sentences we use.  
Let’s start with object-indeterminacy. When philosophers say that there is 
indeterminacy in our every day, medium-sized objects, it usually means that the 
boundary of objects is indeterminate. The spatiotemporal boundary of physical 
objects, mostly medium-sized objects, is vague. The range of these medium-sized 
objects stretches from small cells to big stars and planets. When a cell division occurs, 
it is indeterminate when a parent cell stops existing and two or more daughter cells 
start existing. It is indeterminate where the spatiotemporal boundary of a cell lies.  
Consider a ‘person’. It seems indeterminate when exactly a person starts existing 
or stops existing. When does a foetus become a person? Is it when the doctors can 
see the brain, or when the heart starts pumping? Could it be right before birth or 
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right after birth? Likewise, is there a specific time when a person stops existing? Is it 
when a person loses their consciousness, or when the heart stops beating? The 
answers to these questions are, or at least may be, indeterminate. 
One of the best-known examples of object-indeterminacy is from Peter Unger. 
Endorsing metaphysical indeterminacy of the inanimate objects, such as stones and 
cups, to the extreme, Unger (1979) famously argued that there are no ordinary things. 
According to his argument of ‘the sorites of decomposition by minute removals’, 
there cannot be any stones or cups. If a stone is composed of a million atoms, is the 
stone without one atom still a stone? Of course, we say yes, and the sorites induction 
step continues. The stone becomes fully decomposed while we are forced to say that 
the stone without one atom is still a stone, the stone without one more atom is still a 
stone, and so forth. Are there clear joints in nature that demarcate objects? 
According to those who accept object-indeterminacy, no.75 According to those who 
do not accept object-indeterminacy, namely epistemicists, there are joints, but these 
joints maybe unbeknownst to us.76 
Property-indeterminacy refers to the state of properties that could be either 
instantiated or not. Barnes (2014: 348) gives us a toy example: 
Suppose we’ve got two simples, a and b. We’ve also got two spatial regions: 
simple a is in region 1 and simple b is in region 2. We’ve also got two 
fundamental properties (or fundamental predicates) F and G. One of each of a 
and b is one of each of F and G. It’s not the case that both a and b are F, or that 
both a and b are G. But suppose that’s all that’s settled. Suppose nothing settles 
whether a is F and b is G, or vice versa. So we either have a case where things 
are F at 1 and G at 2, or a case where things are G at 1 and F and 2. But we can’t 
say any more than this.  
 
75 See Evans (1978) for arguing against vague objects. See Merricks (2001) for relational indeterminacy. That the 
identity relations between individuals are indeterminate is defended by the onticists such as Peter van Inwagen 
(1990), Michael Tye (1990), E. J. Lowe (1994), and Terence Parsons (2000). For vague existence, see Hawley 
(2002), van Inwagen (1990), Tye (1990), and Smith (2005). 
76 I will discuss epistemicism in detail in §3.4. 
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We can apply the toy example above to a vague property, ‘tallness’. Let’s say that 
either Hana is tall or not tall. Nothing settles whether Hana is tall. Whether the 
property, tallness, is instantiated in Hana is indeterminate.  
One could point out that there is nothing special about vague properties being 
indeterminate. Being indeterminate is exactly what makes vague properties vague. 
Consider these properties instead: ‘identical to’, ‘better than’, and ‘worse than’. There 
is nothing indeterminate about the identity relation when we say that a is identical 
to b. (e.g. Clark Kent is Superman). When there is a moral fact, e.g. saving three 
drowning children is better than saving two drowning children, the property of 
“better than” is instantiated in this fact.  
However, I do not want to conclude quickly that these properties are not 
indeterminate. There have been attempts to argue that the identity relation in “a is 
identical to b” is indeterminate. For example, Parsons and Woodruff (1995: 181) 
argued that “It is indeterminate whether a is identical to b iff there is no property 
such that a has it and b lacks it (or vice versa), and there is some property that one 
of them has or lacks and such that the other is indeterminate with respect to having.” 
The example of such would be Derek Parfit’s personal identity. According to Parfit 
(1984), when a person A goes through fission, it is indeterminate whether person A 
is identical to person B or C who has been appeared anew from fission. If person A 
is identical to person B, then there’s no property that person A has it and b lacks it. 
But if person A is identical to person B, there is some property that A or B has or 
lacks, and that person C is indeterminate with respect to having. An example of such 
property could be where all the atoms in the body are located when person B or C 
started to exist, or what person B or C has thought when they first started to exist.  
So far, we have talked about object-indeterminacy and property-indeterminacy. 
Worldly-indeterminacy refers to indeterminate states of affairs. Taylor and Burgess 
(2015) explain worldly-indeterminacy as metaphysical indeterminacy which consists 
“in portions or aspects of reality itself being somehow unsettled, quite independently 
50 
 
of whether and how we think or talk about them” (298).77 One can easily confuse 
metaphysical indeterminacy with epistemic or semantic indeterminacy. If one 
believes that the language which describes the world is indeterminate, then the world, 
which we gain knowledge through our language, would naturally look indeterminate. 
Likewise, if our knowledge about the world is indeterminate, then the world itself 
might look indeterminate as well. However, world-indeterminacy does not depend 
on epistemic or semantic indeterminacy; the defenders of world-indeterminacy 
would say. Even if we use a perfect language without any ambiguities, there still can 
be world-indeterminacy. Even if there is nothing that we do not know about the 
world, there still can be world-indeterminacy.  
If this explanation us too abstract to grasp, another explanation of world-
indeterminacy is given by Akiba (2004): To take the world to be indeterminate is to 
take the world to have the fifth dimension, in addition to the three dimensions of 
space and the fourth temporal dimension. This fifth dimension is made up of 
precisified worlds. J. R. G. Williams (2008b: 771) explains in detail: 
Suppose that there are a range of perfectly precise ways for reality to be, and 
suppose reality itself is indeterminate. For simplicity, suppose that there are just 
two ways, differing in that the first (w1) says that p, the second (w2) says that ¬p. 
Following the line suggested above, however, it may be that in reality it is 
determinate that p ∨ ¬p but indeterminate which disjunct holds. If all else is equal, 
then it seems to follow (i) that determinately, either w1 or w2 represent reality 
correctly; but (ii) it is indeterminate whether w1 represents reality aright, and 
indeterminate whether w2 represents reality aright. 
To understand Williams’ explanation, let’s go back to the example that I have given 
in the introduction. In w1, it is permissible to take the £5 on the ground; in w2, it is 
impermissible to take the £5 on the ground. Either w1 or w2 represents the moral 
 
77 One of the simple reasons to believe in metaphysical indeterminacy – that the world is indeterminate – is given 
by the argument from quantum mechanics (Akiba 2004). It provides, at least, a partial refutation to the idea that 
everything is determined in the world. According to the current orthodox Copenhagen Interpretation, it is 
indeterminate whether a particle is located at a specific location x with a certain momentum m. Although the 
debates in quantum mechanics might be irrelevant to the debates that philosophers are having in vagueness, 
quantum mechanics provides us a reason to accept that there is indeterminacy in the physical world. 
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reality correctly. However, it is indeterminate whether w1 or w2 represents the moral 
reality aright.  
 
3.3.2 Metaphysical Indeterminacy as Precisified Worlds 
Now, let’s change the example of world-indeterminacy more complicated by 
adding more worlds between w1 and w2. This step is necessary for us to understand 
what metaphysical indeterminacy amounts to because the world is not as simple as 
the simplified version above. I will complicate the example by bringing in object-
indeterminacy and property-indeterminacy. Object-indeterminacy tells us that o’s 
boundary is indeterminate. It is indeterminate what o’s supposed to be when there 
are too many o’s from which we can choose. Property-indeterminacy also tells us that 
it is indeterminate whether F is instantiated in o or not. We have seen in the above 
example that it is indeterminate that the property of being tall is instantiated in Hana. 
In addition to object-indeterminacy and property-indeterminacy, world-
indeterminacy bring us more indeterminacy into the picture. A state of affairs 
consists of an object o and a property p. There is a state of affairs where, for any 
object o and any property F, o has F. A state of affairs obtains if and only if, o has F. 
But how does a state of affairs obtain if it is indeterminate whether o has F? As 
Williams explained above, the reality is either the case that o has F or it is not the 
case that o has F. But it is indeterminate which case represents the reality aright. To 
recap, there seem to be three layers of metaphysical indeterminacy: an object’s 
boundary is indeterminate; it is indeterminate whether a property is instantiated; it 
is indeterminate whether a certain state of affairs represents the reality aright. 
Here’s an example of metaphysical indeterminacy. Consider the moral fact that 
lying is wrong. If this fact is metaphysically indeterminate, then the object, the action 
‘lying’, and the property, ‘wrong’, are indeterminate. How so? There are cases of 
definitely lying and cases that are definitely not lying. There are also borderline cases 
of lying. For example, saying “you are nice” to a mean person is a lie. Saying “you are 
nice” to a nice person is not a lie. Saying “you are nice” to a borderline nice person is 
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a borderline lie. Let’s line up the cases of lying, and group the cases into ‘lying’, 
‘borderline lying’, and ‘not lying’.78 Table (a) below visualizes the first precisification 
of drawing the boundary of ‘lying’: 
Lying Borderline Lying Not Lying 
 
However, it is also possible to count borderline lying as definitely lying because there 
could be a world where there are more instances of lying than the instances of not 
lying, but never the instances of borderline lying. Therefore, table (b) visualizes the 
second precisification that considers borderline lying as lying: 
Lying Not Lying 
 
Borderline lying might not be lying in some worlds. Therefore, table (c) visualizes 
the third precisification that counts borderline lying as not lying: 
Lying Not Lying 
 
Then we could say that there are three ways to draw the boundary of ‘lying’: (a), 
(b), and (c). Next, consider the property, ‘wrongness’. The property is either 
instantiated or not instantiated. Property-indeterminacy tells us that there are 
instances where it is indeterminate whether the property is instantiated or not. Like 
we have done above, we line up the cases of instantiations and divide them up into 
three groups. Table (1) below visualizes how the property is instantiated or not: 
 
 
78 Of course, one can group the cases into more than three divisions. For instance, the cases can be divided into 
‘lying,’ ‘borderline lying’, ‘borderline not lying’, ‘not lying’. However, for the sake of simplicity, I will divide up 
the groups into three. 
Wrongness Instantiated 
Indeterminate whether 
Wrongness Instantiated 
Wrongness Not 
Instantiated 
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However, if it is indeterminate whether ‘wrongness’ is instantiated or not, then just 
to be safe, we can count all the indeterminate instantiations of wrongness as 
wrongness. Applying the same division from the table (b) above, we get table (2) 
below: 
Wrongness Instantiated 
Wrongness Not 
Instantiated 
 
Or we can count all the indeterminate instantiations of wrongness as not wrong. 
Applying the same division from the table (c) above, we get table (3) below: 
Wrongness Instantiated Wrongness Not Instantiated 
 
Then again, we could say that there are three ways to divide up the instantiations of 
a property: (1), (2), and (3).  
Now, let’s combine (a), (b), and (c) with (1), (2), (3) since a state of affairs 
consists of an object and a property. There are nine precisifications that could 
represent the moral reality equally: (a) with (1), (a) with (2), (a) with (3), (b) with (1), 
(b) with (2), (b) with (3), (c) with (1), (c) with (2), and (c) with (3).  
Let’s visualize each precisification of the moral fact that lying is wrong. The first 
precisification of the moral fact that lying is wrong is visualised below. The table 
below represents a state of affairs with (a) and (1). In this world, wrongness is 
instantiated in the cases of lying. Depending on the intention of the speaker or a 
specific context, a certain speech act could be borderline lying. For the cases of 
borderline lying, it is indeterminate whether wrongness is instantiated. Let’s call this 
state of affairs w1: 
Lying Borderline Lying Not Lying 
Wrongness Instantiated 
Indeterminate whether 
Wrongness Instantiated 
Wrongness Not 
Instantiated 
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The second precisification is (a) and (2), where three divisions for ‘lying’ stay the 
same, but there are only two divisions for ‘wrongness’. Either wrongness is 
instantiated or not instantiated, but the scope of wrongness is wider. All the 
indeterminate instantiations of wrongness are counted as the definite instantiations 
of wrongness. The dot below represents a case where borderline lying is wrong. In 
this world, every borderline lying is wrong. Let’s call this state of affairs w2: 
Lying Borderline Lying Not Lying 
Wrongness Instantiated 
Wrongness Not 
Instantiated 
 
The third precisification is (a) with (3), where three divisions for “lying” stay the 
same, and there are two divisions for “wrongness” like above. Either wrongness is 
instantiated or not instantiated, but here the scope of wrongness is narrower. All the 
indeterminate instantiations of wrongness are not counted as the instantiations of 
wrongness. The dot below represents a case where borderline lying is not wrong. In 
this world, every borderline lying is not wrong. Let’s call this state of affairs w3: 
Lying Borderline Lying Not Lying 
Wrongness Instantiated Wrongness Not Instantiated 
 
The fourth precisification is (b) with (1), where there are two divisions for “lying” 
and three divisions for “wrongness”. Either there are cases of lying or not lying, but 
all the cases of borderline lying are considered as definite cases of lying. The dot 
below represents the cases where some cases of lying are neither wrong nor not 
wrong. In this world, there are some cases of lying that it is indeterminate whether 
wrongness is instantiated. Let’s call this state of affairs w4: 
Lying Not Lying 
Wrongness instantiated Indeterminate whether 
Wrongness Instantiated 
Wrongness Not 
Instantiated 
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The fifth precisification is (b) with (2), where there are two divisions for “lying” 
and two divisions for “wrongness”: lying or not lying, and wrong or not wrong. The 
cases of borderline lying are the cases of lying. Likewise, either wrongness is 
instantiated or not instantiated, but the scope of wrongness is wider. All the 
indeterminate instantiations of wrongness are considered as the instantiations of 
wrongness. In this world, the moral fact that lying is wrong covers a wider scope, 
including all the indeterminate cases. Therefore, the dot below represents the cases 
where the borderline cases of lying are considered as the cases of lying, and these 
cases lying are all wrong. In w4 above, it is indeterminate whether wrongness is 
instantiated or not in these very cases of lying. In this world, however, wrongness is 
instantiated in these cases of lying. Let’s call this state of affairs w5: 
Lying Not Lying 
Wrongness instantiated 
Wrongness Not 
Instantiated 
 
The sixth precisification is (b) with (3), where there are two divisions for “lying” 
and two divisions for “wrongness”. The scope of “lying” stays the same as above, but 
the scope of “wrongness’ changes. Either wrongness is instantiated or not, but all the 
indeterminate instantiations of wrongness are not counted as the instantiations of 
wrongness. The dot below represents the cases where some cases of lying are not 
wrong. Let’s call this state of affairs w6: 
Lying Not Lying 
Wrongness instantiated Wrongness Not Instantiated 
 
The seventh precisification is (c) with (1), where there are two divisions for “lying” 
and three divisions for “wrongness”. Either there are cases of lying or not lying, but 
all the cases of borderline lying are considered as the cases of not lying. The dot below 
represents the cases where some cases of not lying are neither wrong nor not wrong. 
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In this world, there are some cases of not lying that it is indeterminate whether 
wrongness is instantiated. Let’s call this state of affairs w7: 
Lying Not Lying 
Wrongness instantiated 
Indeterminate whether 
Wrongness Instantiated 
Wrongness Not 
Instantiated 
 
The eighth precisification is (c) with (2), where there are two divisions for “lying” 
and two divisions for “wrongness”. Either there are cases of lying or not lying, but all 
the cases of borderline lying are considered as the cases of not lying. Either 
wrongness is instantiated or not instantiated, but the cases where it is indeterminate 
whether wrongness is instantiated or not are considered as the cases of wrongness 
instantiated. Then blue dot below represents the cases where some borderline cases 
of lying are considered as the cases of not lying but still wrong to do so. Let’s call this 
state of affairs w8: 
Lying Not Lying 
Wrongness instantiated 
Wrongness Not 
Instantiated 
 
The ninth precisification is (c) with (3), where there are two divisions for “lying” 
and two divisions for “wrongness”. The scope of “lying” stays the same as above, but 
the scope of “wrongness” changes. Either wrongness is instantiated or not, but all 
the indeterminate instantiations of wrongness are not counted as the instantiations 
of wrongness. Then dot below represents the cases where some borderline cases of 
lying are considered as the cases of not lying, and they are not wrong. Let’s call this 
state of affairs w9: 
Lying Not Lying 
Wrongness instantiated Wrongness Not Instantiated 
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What is the conclusion that we draw from these precisifications? These nine 
worlds equally represent the moral fact that lying is wrong, but it is indeterminate 
which world accurately represents the moral reality. How come? It is because there 
are three different ways to draw the boundary of an object ((a), (b), or (c)) and there 
are three different ways of a property being instantiated ((1), (2), or (3)). Are the 
cases of borderline lying the cases of lying or not? Is wrongness instantiated or not 
in the cases of borderline lying? The answers to these questions depend on the worlds 
above. But should the cases of borderline lying be the cases of lying? Should 
wrongness be instantiated in the cases of borderline lying? The answers to these 
questions depend on the moral reality. What is the moral reality, then, out of these 
nine worlds? If one thinks that there is the moral reality, but we are just not aware 
of it or we just do not have the means to know the reality, she’s an epistemicist (which 
is the topic of §3.4). However, if one defends metaphysical indeterminacy, there are 
many precisified worlds, and it is just indeterminate which one of these worlds 
correctly represent the reality.79 
 
3.3.3 Metaphysical Indeterminacy in Metaethics 
So far, we have grasped some idea of what metaphysical indeterminacy is. Now 
let’s find out what metaethicists have said about metaphysical indeterminacy. We 
want to know what metaethicists have to say about metaphysical indeterminacy 
because we are interested in finding out how metaethicists deal with indeterminacy, 
especially moral realists. 
Even though there have been some attempts to explain metaphysical 
indeterminacy in metaethics, I want to focus on the works of three philosophers: 
Ralph Wedgewood, Ruth Chang, and Russ Shafer-Landau. The reason why I chose 
these three philosophers is that each of them has something unique to say about 
 
79 My analysis of metaphysical indeterminacy is similar to Taylor and Burgess (2015)’s conclusion that given 
semantic indeterminacy, there is metaphysical indeterminacy which grounds semantic indeterminacy. 
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metaphysical indeterminacy in metaethics. Taking the notion of “better than” or 
“worse than” as primitive, Wedgewood claims that there is no metaphysical 
indeterminacy. Moral actions (as well as values or reasons are always comparable to 
each other; either one of them is better or worse than the other, or they are tied. 
However, Chang disagrees. She thinks that two actions might be incommensurable. 
Shafer-Landau takes the middle ground: there are some cases that are 
metaphysically indeterminate, and there are some cases that are not metaphysically 
indeterminate. Let’s examine each in turn, especially focusing on Shafer-Landau’s 
account because his account is very relevant to the debate regarding moral realists 
and indeterminacy. 
First, for Wedgwood (2018) fundamental ethical and normative notions (such as 
‘good’ and ‘permissible’) are all essentially comparative (“a is better than b” and 
“There is more reason for a than for b.”). Consider “φ-ing is permissible.” At first 
reading, the sentence does not involve any comparative notion. However, according 
to Wedgwood, “φ-ing is permissible” is equivalent to “There is at least as much 
reason for φ-ing as for any available alternative, ψ-ing.” In other words, it is not the 
case that there are more reasons to ψ than φ.80 I will come back to Wedgwood in 
detail in §3.4.1 because epistemicism would describe his position better. I mentioned 
Wedgwood here to contrast him with other metaethicists such as Chang and Shafer-
Landau.  
Second, for Chang (2002, 2016), not every ethical or normative notion can be 
reduced to comparative relations. Even though she thinks that there are three 
fundamental relations, “better than,” “worse than,” and “equal to,” there is the fourth 
relation, “on a par”. Other author says that “on a par” relation represents semantic 
or metaphysical indeterminacy81, but Chang does not agree that “on a par” relation 
represents indeterminacy. In this thesis, Chang’s position is not considered because 
 
80 The same reasoning applies not only to comparing reasons, but also to comparing the weights of reasons. Not 
all the weights of reasons need to be compared. The weights can be partially ordered and compared to each other 
(Wedgewood 2018). 
81 For example, see Broome (1997). 
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she has yet to give a clear argument on why “on a par” relation is different from 
metaphysical indeterminacy. 
Lastly and importantly, Shafer-Landau’s (1994, 1995) work is one of the few that 
directly deals with the topic of my thesis: examining whether moral realism is 
compatible with metaphysical indeterminacy. While typical moral realists find 
metaphysical indeterminacy threatening to moral realism, Shafer-Landau (1995: 83) 
accepts metaphysical indeterminacy as a given feature of moral reality. Some 
extensions of moral properties are indeterminate, and moral sentences reflect such 
indeterminacy. In particular, moral reality reflects indeterminacy if moral reality is 
represented by noncomparative sentences in the form of “a is F”, rather than 
comparative sentences in the form of “a is F-er than b”. It seems to be that Shafer-
Landau agrees with Wedgwood on this point that moral reality is determinate when 
represented by comparative sentences.82  
Why does Shafer-Landau think that noncomparative moral reality is 
indeterminate? It is because, as I have explained in §3.3.1, a state of affairs consists 
of an object and a property in which we can easily identify object-indeterminacy and 
property-indeterminacy. Consider the moral reality represented by “Plato is pious.” 
Whereas it is relatively easy to pick out who Plato is, it might be indeterminate 
whether ‘being pious’ is instantiated or not. Whether ‘being pious’ is instantiated or 
not might depend on the sincerity of his religious belief, his virtuous deeds, his 
attitudes towards other believers, willingness to sacrifice, tolerance towards others 
whose religious practices differ from his own, or how much he makes an offering. 
For the sake of the argument, let’s assume that ‘being sincere’ and ‘being tolerant’ 
exhaustively constitute ‘being pious.’ Plato is pious if and only if Plato is sincere and 
 
82  The main difference between comparative cases and noncomparative cases lies in whether there is an 
overarching standard that can compare the two (or more) values. Comparative cases deal with whether a is more 
F-er than b when a and b are both morally F. In metaethics, this debate is known as ‘incommensurability of 
values.’ Statements regarding the incommensurability of values have a similar structure with vague statements: 
two items or values are incomparable or incommensurable if (1) it is neither determinately true nor 
determinately false that they are equally good and (2) neither determinately true nor determinately false that 
either is better or worse. For the helpful discussion whether incommensurability is vagueness, see Broome (1997) 
and Rabinowicz (2009). 
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tolerant. However, indeterminacy remains. How come? It is because it is 
indeterminate which criterion gets more weight.83 Plato might be more sincere than 
tolerant. In contrast, Aristotle might be more tolerant than sincere. If only one 
person out of the two can be pious, who is pious? Either Plato is pious or Aristotle is 
pious, but it is indeterminate in whom the property instantiates.  
Then would appealing to comparative notions help us figure out who is pious 
since Wedgewood and Shafer-Landau said that comparative notions are determinate? 
No. It is because even though it might be determinate that Aristotle is more tolerant 
than Plato, it is still indeterminate whether Aristotle is pious.84 What is worse here is 
that comparative notions are not as determinate as Wedgewood and Shafer-Landau 
think they are. Let’s change the situation a little bit. Plato is still more sincere than 
tolerant, and Aristotle is more tolerant than sincere. If only two people can be pious, 
then Plato is pious as well as Aristotle. Now, it is determinate that Plato and Aristotle 
are both pious, but it is indeterminate whether Plato is more pious than Aristotle (or 
vice versa). Therefore, indeterminacy still remains in both comparative and 
noncomparative notions in moral reality. No matter whether moral reality is 
comparative or noncomparative, multiple governing criteria give rise to 
indeterminacy. 
 
3.3.4 Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Logic in Metaethics 
It is worth mentioning here the connection between logic and metaphysical 
indeterminacy in metaethics. Shafer-Landau rejects the principle of bivalence in 
order to explain how moral realism can be compatible with metaphysical 
 
83 Shafer-Landau’s own example is the following. A scientific theory appeals to a variety of explanatory virtues – 
simplicity, generality, testability, etc. There is no single overarching value to determine to which of these virtues 
is the best or can be reduced. There is no one method to combine these various dimensions of the criteria. Instead, 
what scientists do is to reason together and determine the best theory. Value monists seem to have the solution 
to this kind of indeterminacy because they endorse a single moral value (which might be ‘good’ or ‘best’) which 
is the most ethically fundamental of all, intrinsically valuable, from which every other moral value is derived. 
However, Shafer-Landau opposes to value monism in favour or value pluralism. For the discussion, see Shafer-
Landau (1995). 
84 We can run the same reasoning process to figure out what constitute being tolerant and conclude that it is 
indeterminate whether ‘being tolerant’ is instantiated in Aristotle. It will result in infinite regress. 
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indeterminacy. In this section, I explain why I think his position is problematic. In 
chapter 2, I have argued that not only is it advantageous for moral realists to take 
classical logic to be the default logical system that they use, but also it is costly for 
realists to accept non-classical logic. Pointing out that his argument is problematic 
is important in this section because I will suggest a solution to Shafer-Landau’s 
position in chapter 4, which does not require us to reject the main principles of 
classical logic. 
According to Shafer-Landau, “If it is indeterminate whether some x is morally F, 
then neither of the following claims can be true: (i) x is F. (ii) It is false that x is F” 
(85). He also used the phrase “(i) and (ii) are untrue, though not false” (83). Let me 
rephrase what he is trying to say here. If something is morally indeterminate whether 
x is F (e.g. lying is wrong), then it is not true that whether x is F or x is not F. Pay 
attention to how he used the phrase, ‘not true,’ ‘untrue,’ and ‘not false.’ If both “x is 
F” and “x is not F” are not true and not false, then it means that the principle of 
bivalence, that every sentence expressing a proposition is either true or false, is 
rejected.  
By rejecting the principle of bivalence, Shafer-Landau seems to reject the law of 
excluded middle (LEM) as well.85 Rejecting the principle of bivalence, Shafer-Landau 
would surely say that if it is indeterminate that Plato is pious, then “Plato is pious” is 
neither true nor false. Then let’s ask him whether p (Plato is pious) or not-p (It is not 
the case that Plato is pious). According to LEM, either it is the case that Plato is pious, 
or it is not the case that Plato is pious. Since he thinks it is neither true nor false that 
Plato is pious, it also follows that it is neither p or not-p. Then, following his own 
argument, Shafer-Landau must reject LEM, too.  
But what’s wrong with rejecting bivalence and LEM in order to explain 
metaphysical indeterminacy? Is it not the most intuitive explanation to metaphysical 
indeterminacy? If it is indeterminate whether x is F, then it sounds intuitive to say 
 
85 I have explained how rejecting the principle of bivalence leads to rejecting the law of excluded middle in 
chapter 2. 
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that it is neither true nor false that x is F. While Shafer-Landau’s rejection of 
bivalence and LEM seems plausible, I think the rejection of bivalence and LEM is 
problematic. Even though it sounds plausible to reject the principle of bivalence and 
LEM just for the noncomparative cases of moral sentences as Shafer-Landau 
suggests, there are some problems with his claim. The first problem is that, as I have 
explained in the last section, comparative cases are metaphysically indeterminate as 
well. To recap, given that “x is pious if and only if x is sincere and tolerant”, the truth-
value of “Plato is more pious than Aristotle”, namely a comparative sentence, is 
indeterminate when Plato is more sincere than tolerant, and Aristotle is more 
tolerance than sincere. Therefore, the problem of indeterminacy is not limited only 
to noncomparative cases.  
Then should you reject the bivalence and LEM, which also follows that you are 
rejecting classical logic (since the principle of bivalence and LEM are necessary to 
classical logic, to comparative moral reality as well? Rejecting classical logic is a 
serious cost to moral realists. If LEM is to be rejected, moral realism starts to lose its 
intuitive force because it is not compatible with classical logic anymore. A moral 
realist should always want her view to be compatible with classical logic, as I have 
argued in chapter 2.86 The serious cost of giving up on LEM is that some of our 
intuitive judgments regarding noncomparative and comparative moral matters 
become counterintuitive.  
Let’s first examine how unintuitive it is to give up LEM. For example, when I 
need to unlock the door of my house, it seems like the law of excluded middle tells 
me that the key is in my pocket or it is not the case that the key is in my pocket. This 
rule of logic assumes nothing metaphysical but reflects the barest way of reasoning: 
nothing is both in my pocket and not in my pocket. Since moral reality is as “precise 
as the realm of mathematics” (Wedgwood 2018), either p or not-p. As I have argued 
in chapter 2, the LEM has a strong connection with the objective reality in the world 
because the reality is either the way it is or not the way it is (Dummett 2006: 48). If 
 
86  According to Billy Dunaway (2016: 253), a typical moral realist will say that “There is no widespread 
indeterminacy in what “ought” and other normative terms refer to.” 
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one denies LEM, then one needs to deny such an intuition that there is an objective 
moral reality.  
One of the upshots of rejecting LEM is to decide which logic Shafer-Landau 
should instead accept. Although there are lots of logics that do not have LEM as a 
theorem, none of those logics would look attractive for moral realists to accept. 
Consider intuitionistic logic because it is one of the most familiar. 87  One of the 
problems of accepting intuitionistic logic is the failure of double negation 
elimination. Intuitionistic logic rejects double negation elimination, which is the rule 
that not-not-p entails p. Therefore, in intuitionistic logic, one cannot infer from "It 
is not the case that it is not the case that murder is wrong” to "murder is wrong” as a 
logical inference. Then it sounds even more counterintuitive than rejecting LEM. In 
sum, denying LEM comes with a cost. Moral realists would not want to pay the cost 
of giving up classical logic. In chapter 4, I suggest a solution to overcome this 
problem. In chapter 5, I explain how moral realists can use a version of moral realism 
that I suggest in chapter 4 to explain genuine moral disagreement.  
 
3.4 Epistemic Indeterminacy 
So far, we have covered semantic indeterminacy and metaphysical 
indeterminacy, the types of indeterminacy that originate externally from us, namely 
from language and world. Epistemic indeterminacy, on the other hand, is unique 
because epistemic indeterminacy is compatible with (or entailed by) semantic 
indeterminacy and metaphysical indeterminacy. Refer to the table below and see the 
column under ‘semantic indeterminacy’: because our language is not determinate, 
 
87 Another familiar logic that does have the law of excluded middle as a theorem is K3. However, it is far more 
problematic than intuitionistic logic. It does have double negation elimination, but it doesn't have reductio or 
conditional proof as inference rules, and it has no theorems at all. Supervaluationism rejects Bivalence but 
accepts LEM. Supervaluationism requires rejection of inference rules such as contraposition, conditional proof 
and reductio ad absurdum. Would Shafer-Landau want these results? No. According to Dorothy Edgington (2010: 
104), supervaluationism also rejects equivalence schema (e.g. it is true that x is red if and only if x is red): “It 
follows that either x is red but it’s not true that x is red, or x is not red but it’s not false that x is red. Again, suppose 
Bivalence is clearly false for borderline cases, and x is a clear borderline case. Then it is clearly not true that x is 
red, and clearly false that x is red. This seems wrong. ‘x is red’ should be a borderline case of truth, not a clear 
case of non-truth.” 
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we do not know whether p. Epistemic indeterminacy follows from semantic 
indeterminacy. See the column under ‘metaphysical indeterminacy’: because the 
world is not determinate, we do not know whether p. Epistemic indeterminacy 
follows from metaphysical indeterminacy.  
 Epistemicism 
Semantic 
Indeterminacy 
Metaphysical 
Indeterminacy 
“World is  
determinate.” 
Yes Does not matter No 
“Language is 
determinate.” 
Yes No Does not matter 
“We do not know 
whether p.” 
(Epistemic 
Indeterminacy) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
Epistemicism, however, is different from epistemic indeterminacy in such a way 
that epistemicism is not compatible with semantic indeterminacy or metaphysical 
indeterminacy. Epistemicism does not follow from semantic or metaphysical 
indeterminacy. Epistemicists finds the cause of indeterminacy in us rather than the 
external world. The world is determinate. Our language might be determinate, too. 
However, due to our limited ability to know about the world, we are not in a position 
to know every detail about the world. Indeterminacy is nothing but our ignorance 
about the world. This is the epistemicist position.  
Epistemicism is, arguably, the default position to hold if one is a moral realist. It 
is because epistemicism seems extremely compatible with moral realism at a first 
glace. There is no conflict between epistemicism and the tenets of moral realism that 
I have identified in chapter 2. Then why even bother mention epistemicism? It is 
because even though epistemicism is easily compatible with moral realism, it comes 
with a cost: under epistemicism, moral facts fail to be action-guiding.  
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I have two aims for this section. First is to explain what epistemicism is and why 
epistemicism is the most compatible with moral realism among the three. Second, I 
discuss the cost that comes with the position. In chapter 4, I provide some solutions 
to the cost. 
 
3.4.1 Epistemicism 
What differentiates epistemicism from semantic indeterminacy or metaphysical 
indeterminacy is, as the name suggests, the cause of indeterminacy: our epistemic 
ability. What makes epistemicism unique from other positions is that our ignorance 
does not result from something else, such as world or language. Our ignorance 
results from our epistemic limitations. 
Endorsing epistemicism, Timothy Williamson (1994: 195, 1995) thinks that 
“determinately” should be treated as equivalent to “knowably.” Indeterminate truth 
is simply unknowable truth. Epistemic indeterminacy is ignorance about a fully 
determinate, factual matter.88 Here is an example. There is nothing indeterminate 
about the world. When people are lined up from tall to not tall, there are no 
borderline cases of being tall or not tall. Even if the difference between two people is 
0.1 cm or 0.01 cm, it does not matter. If being tall starts from 170 cm, then a person 
who is 169.99 cm is not tall. She must be 170 cm in order to be tall. Even though we 
do not know from what centimetre people start being tall, it is determinate that there 
is a height where people start being tall.  
Then according to epistemicism, “Hana is tall” must be either true or false. Not 
deviating from classical logic, epistemicism remains faithfully to the principle of 
bivalence: “In cases of unclarity, statements remain true or false, but speakers of the 
language have no way of knowing which” (Williamson 1994: 3). Even though there 
 
88  Some might be happy to say that Williamson clearly says that language is determinate. According to 
Williamson, meaning is use. We have been using ‘tall’, for example, in a certain way over the years, but there is 
no possible way to track down the use in the past. Williamson (1994: 206) says, “Although meaning may 
supervene on use, there is no algorithm for calculating the former from the latter.” Since it is not possible to know 
how ‘tall’ has been used in the past, we do not know its application conditions. 
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is a clear cut-off point between a person who is tall and who is not tall, we just do not 
know how or where the predicate’s extensions fall.89 Why do we not know where the 
precise cut-off point lies? According to Williamson, we do not know whether “Hana 
is tall” because we cannot keep track of how ‘tall’ has been used through time. If the 
overall language usage pattern of ‘tall’ had been slightly shifted, the cut-off point of 
‘tall’ would have changed. 
Epistemicism is often met with incredulous stare because of its very unintuitive 
nature. It is unintuitive to think that there is a cut-off point for every vague predicate. 
However, I take epistemicism seriously in my thesis because 
the epistemic view implies a form of realism, that even the truth about the 
boundaries of our concepts can outrun our capacity to know it. To deny the 
epistemic view of vagueness is therefore to impose limits on realism; to assert 
it is to endorse realism in a thoroughgoing form. (Williamson 1994: 4) 
Epistemicism is, from the start, true to classical logic. This feature of epistemicism 
should be worth emphasizing because it is quite easy to find philosophers using non-
classical logic to explain metaphysical indeterminacy or semantic indeterminacy. As 
I have argued that moral realists should, by default, accept classical logic, it is 
common that the realists find epistemicism the most appealing if they want to 
explain any kind of indeterminacy. The law of excluded middle and the law of 
bivalence are preserved for every moral sentence.  
This is how moral realists would explain moral indeterminacy if they accept 
epistemicism. If there is predicate-indeterminacy, an epistemicist would say that a 
term definitely refers to a moral property, but we do not know and cannot know what 
that property is. If there is sentence-indeterminacy, an epistemicist would say that 
we do not know and cannot know what state of affairs the sentence represents. 
Soriticality never ends up in a paradox because there is a clear cut-off point. We just 
do not know and cannot know where the cut-off point is.  
 
89 These are called ‘blindspots’, according to Sorensen (1988). Even if we had all the evidence about Hana’s height 
and everyone else’s height in the world, we cannot know where the cut-off point of ‘tall’ lies.  
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Wedgwood (2018) endorses such a view. He is “unpersuaded of the case that 
there is any such thing as moral vagueness” because there is always a sharp cut-off 
point in the moral soritical series. Taking all ethical notions to be fundamentally 
comparative, Wedgwood thinks that there is no vagueness or indeterminacy in 
“better than” or “worse than” relations. This is his analogy: let’s imagine ourselves 
holding different weights in our hands. We might not be able to tell which weight is 
heavier than the other if one (Mass 1) weighs 5 kg and the other (Mass 2) weighs 5.01 
kg. However, there is no indeterminacy. Mass 1 is weightier than Mass 2.90 We just 
cannot always know that Mass 1 is weightier Mass 2 because of our limited powers 
of measurement. Just as comparing two weights are never vague, comparing ethical 
or normative concepts are never vague either. There is no indeterminacy in “Φ-ing 
is better than Ψ-ing” or “‘Reason 1 is weightier than Reason 2”. We just do not know 
whether it is true or not because our epistemic ability to know all the details is limited.  
 
3.4.2 Moral Epistemicism and its Cost 
Even though epistemicism is compatible with moral realism and the default 
position to hold if one is a moral realist, it comes with a cost: unknown moral facts 
cannot be action-guiding. 91  It is the conceptual truth that moral facts must be 
potentially action-guiding.92 If moral facts are unknown, these moral facts cannot be 
action-guiding. 93  If you do not know what is right or wrong, how can you do 
something right or wrong? You cannot.  
 
90 Wedgwood (2018) says, “If it is vague, it is only because of vagueness in the referring expressions ‘Mass 1’ and 
‘Mass 2’, not because of any vagueness in the predicate ‘__is weightier than__’ or in the relation that the 
predicate stands for.” 
91 The common challenge that epistemicists face is that if moral realism accepts epistemicism, moral realism can 
easily fall into scepticism. It is because not only are some moral facts unknowable, but also we do not know how 
much of the moral facts are unknowable. Sorensen (1995), Oddie (2005), Constantinescu (2014), Dougherty 
(2014), and Schoenfield (2015) all point out the challenge. However, since I deal only with soritical cases, 
unknowable moral facts only exist in borderline cases. If we limit the unknowable moral facts to only borderline 
cases between knowable, definite moral facts, then epistemicism does not fall into skepticism. 
92 See B. Williams (1981), Jonathan  Bennett (1998), and Judith Thomson (2008). 
93 Some argue that, from the assumption that unknown moral facts cannot be action-guiding, all moral facts must 
be knowable. It is because an important aspect of realism is that it is taken to be a position that the sentences 
that deal with an objective reality exist regardless of our ability to gain knowledge about it. In other words, in 
Realism, “the meaning of a declarative sentence consists in its possibly unrecognisable or verification-
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Assume that picking up five pounds from the street is definitely permissible but 
picking up twenty pounds from the street is not permissible. Walking down the street, 
you see a twenty-pound note on the ground. Knowing that picking up a twenty-
pound note is impermissible, you do not take it. Walking down the street again, you 
see a ten-pound note on the ground. Is it permissible to pick it up? According to 
epistemicism, there must be a number, e.g. the cut-off point, between five and twenty 
when it becomes impermissible to pick up, but you do not know and cannot know 
what the number is. Therefore, you do not and cannot know whether picking up a 
ten-pounds note is permissible. You fail to make any decision here because the 
unknown moral fact cannot guide your action in any way. 
In ethics and metaethics, there have been attempts to explain how moral agents 
are able to do the right things when they are not sure what is the right thing to do. 
These moral agents are under moral uncertainty. Moral uncertainty is about how 
much credence or belief a moral agent has when deciding whether to Φ. 94  For 
example, a moral agent under moral uncertainty hesitates to pick up the ten-pound 
note because she might be only 67% confident that picking up the ten-pound note is 
permissible. Since picking up a five-pound note is permissible and picking up a 
twenty-pound note is not permissible, she is 100% confident that picking up a five-
pound note is permissible and 0% confident that picking up a twenty-pound note is 
not permissible. Then she could conclude that she is 67% confident that picking up 
a ten-pound note is permissible. 
Can an epistemicist moral agent adopt such a decision-making process, relying 
on her credence? Of course; a moral agent under moral uncertainty can also be an 
 
transcendent truth condition” (Rasmussen and Ravnkilde 1982: 379). It is commonly assumed that it is 
implausible to think that there are unknowable ethical facts.  
However, some moral facts are and can be unknowable. According to Shafer-Landau (2003), the fundamental 
moral principles are knowable a priori to epistemically ideal agents. If they are knowable, they are knowable a 
priori (Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, 2014). But we are not epistemically ideal agents. Therefore, some moral facts 
might not be knowable. Some moral facts might be unknowable because they are causally inefficacious, as Enoch 
(2011) claims. They are waiting to be discovered, just like any other scientific or mathematical facts. There is no 
need for all moral facts be knowable. That there are unknowable moral facts is also the consequence that 
Dougherty (2014: 361) drives from epistemic indeterminacy. Sorensen (1995) also argues that there are 
unknowable obligations. 
94 E. Harman (2015: 54) calls this position ‘Uncertaintism.’ 
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epistemicist. Because she does not and cannot know whether picking up a ten-pound 
note is permissible, she might choose to rely on her credence. However, in my thesis, 
I am only interested in an epistemicist moral agent whose credence is not relevant 
to her. It is because a moral realist would not want to rely on her credence when 
there is an objective moral fact out there. Her credence might lead her astray to make 
a decision that is, in fact, morally wrong. I take the main difference between a moral 
agent under moral uncertainty and an epistemicist moral agent to be how much they 
let their credence affect the decision.95 
Here is an example of an epistemicist moral agent who does not rely on her 
credence. Walking down the street, she hesitates to pick up the ten-pound note 
because she does not know whether picking up the ten-pound note is permissible. 
All she knows is that it is permissible to pick up a five-pound note and not 
permissible to pick up a twenty-pound note. Since she does not know where the cut-
off point is, what should she do? Her credence is 67%, just as same as the moral agent 
under moral uncertainty, but she cannot rely on her credence. Her credence has 
nothing to do with the cut-off point because the cut-off point could be any amount 
between five and twenty. The chance of cut-off point being anywhere between five 
and twenty is evenly distributed. She does not and cannot know where the cut-off 
point lies, so she does not know what to do. The moral fact, which is unknown to her, 
fails to be action-guiding.  
In chapter 4, I reply to the objection that under epistemicism, moral facts fail to 
be action-guiding. I will argue that unknown moral facts can still be action-guiding 
because epistemicist moral agents would choose to play safe, avoiding what is wrong 
as best as they can when they cannot know what is wrong. 
 
 
95 Therefore, I am not engaging with Weatherson (2014), Lockhart (2000), Guerrero (2007), and Moller (2011) 
who all claim that an agent’s moral credences are relevant to her decision-making. 
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4. Compatibility between Moral Realism and Moral Indeterminacy  
To recap, in chapter 3, I have posited three problems. First, moral terms exhibit 
semantic indeterminacy. Even though moral realists would want to explain how 
moral terms refer to the objective moral reality, oftentimes moral terms exhibit 
multidimensional vagueness. When moral terms are multidimensionally vague, 
their meanings are indeterminate in two ways: it is indeterminate which criteria  
(extension) apply to a term; it is indeterminate whether the object to which the term 
refers (intension) is the (or a) correct referent of the term. To solve such a problem, 
in §4.1, I provide the semantics for multidimensionally vague moral terms. With such 
semantics, I show that moral realists could endorse semantic indeterminacy in a way 
that is not harmful to moral realism. Providing semantics for multidimensionally 
vague moral terms will be helpful to explain why people disagree. It would especially 
explain moral disagreement, when people fail to communicate moral concepts to 
each other (which will be the topic of chapter 5). 
Second, metaphysical indeterminacy is prevalent in both comparative and 
noncomparative states of affairs in ethics. Shafer-landau explains metaphysical 
indeterminacy by rejecting one of the principles of classical logic. In contrast, I argue 
that the version of moral realism that I proposed in chapter 2 is not compatible with 
Shafer-landau’s explanation. It is because moral realists would not want to pay the 
cost of rejecting the principle of bivalence or the law of excluded middle. The version 
of metaphysical indeterminacy that I provide in §4.2 will be compatible with moral 
realism as well as classical logic.  
Third, even though epistemicism is compatible with the version of moral realism 
I proposed in chapter 2, I show that accepting epistemicism comes with a cost. While 
moral facts should be action-guiding, unknown moral facts are not action-guiding. 
Even though there is an option for moral agents to rely on their credence when faced 
with moral uncertainty, it is not an option for epistemicists because relying on their 
credence might be morally risky to do something wrong. In §4.3, I will argue that 
unknown moral facts can be action-guiding.  
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After I argue that semantic indeterminacy, metaphysical indeterminacy, and 
epistemicism are all compatible with moral realism, I will show that moral realism 
will gain more explanatory power than anti-realism in explaining moral 
indeterminacy. With my suggestions in chapter 4, moral realists will be able to clarify 
why moral disagreement is prevalent and explain why moral disagreement does not 
have to be always resolved through convergence or through discovering an objective 
moral truth. 
 
4.1 Compatibility Between Semantic Indeterminacy and Moral Realism 
In this section, I argue that moral realists can explain semantic indeterminacy 
by providing the semantics for multidimensionally vague moral terms. First, I 
introduce Diana Raffman’s (2014) multi-range theory of vagueness. Second, I argue 
that her semantics can be used to explain multidimensionally vague or 
indeterminate moral terms. Third, I reply to some possible objections. 
 
4.1.1 Multi-Range Theory of Vagueness and Semantic Indeterminacy 
In §3.2, I showed that, because most moral terms are multidimensionally vague, 
it is difficult for the moral realists to explain such vagueness. It is never clear what a 
moral sentence means because a name could be indeterminate; a predicate could be 
indeterminate, or a sentence could be indeterminate. In this section, I argue that the 
multi-range theory of vagueness, suggested by Diana Raffman (2014), could be 
helpful for the moral realists to explain semantic indeterminacy.96 I will first explain 
the multi-range theory of vagueness and apply the theory to moral terms, providing 
the semantics for multidimensionally vague moral terms. 
First, let me introduce what Raffman’s multi-range theory of vagueness is, which 
is inspired by Kaplan’s theory of indexicals. Raffman thinks that the vague terms 
 
96 I am on the same page with a fully naturalized robust moral realist, Richard Boyd (1988), who also takes 
indeterminacy to be compatible with moral realism because a definition of a moral term would necessarily be 
semantically indeterminate. 
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behave just like indexicals, such as ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’. So how do indexicals work? 
Indexicals have two different senses: character and context. The character of first-
person indexical, ‘I’, refers to the speaker (Kaplan 1989: 505). If both Hana and Ken 
say, “I am sleepy”, these utterances have the same character: ‘I’ refers the speaker of 
the sentence “I am sleepy”. However, the contents expressed by the sentence are 
different because of the difference in context. A context consists of an agent (namely, 
the speaker), a time, and a location in a possible world. Therefore, in Hana’s 
utterance, ‘I’ refers to this speaker, Hana, whereas in Ken’s utterance, ‘I’ refers to 
that speaker, Ken. By introducing the difference between character and context, 
Kaplan was able to explain how indexicals uniquely behave: indexicals appear to 
have same meaning (i.e. ‘I’ refers to the speaker) while they appear to have different 
meanings, too (i.e. In one context, ‘I’ refers to Hana; in the other, to Ken).  
Whereas Kaplan thinks that non-indexicals terms, especially vague terms such 
as ‘blue’ or ‘rich’, do not behave like indexicals (Kaplan 1989: 506), Raffman 
disagrees. According to Raffman, vague terms have quasi-character just like 
indexicals have character: “the quasi-character of a vague predicate is a context-
invariant element of the word’s content: It is that element of content that is common 
to all contents of the predicate” (Raffman 2014: 78). Just like the character of ‘I’ is 
the speaker, which remains unchanged throughout different contexts, the quasi-
character of ‘tall’ is ‘large in height’. It is because whether the tall object is a building, 
tree, basketball player, or kindergartener, the character of ‘being tall’ always remains 
the same: ‘large in height’. Likewise, the quasi-character of ‘old’ is ‘aged’. No matter 
what the old thing is (a person, apple, painting, fossil), the character of ‘old’ remains 
the same: ‘aged’. 97  Raffman calls this context-invariant element of meaning the 
stable content of a predicate.  
After the stable content is fixed, different contexts are applied to a vague term, 
just like indexicals. Raffman calls such a context V-index. Similar to the context of 
an indexical, the V-index of a vague term consists of “a respect (dimension, activity) 
 
97 Even though the definition seems circular, Raffman thinks that “if there is any circularity in our account of the 
quasi-character of a vague word, it is no worse than the kind of circularity we find in the dictionary” (2014: 78). 
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r, an opposed or contrastive category c, and a comparison class cc that is usually 
defined in part by time, place, and world” (81). 98 Now let’s put this V-index into 
practice. One V-index for ‘old’ could be {human’s age; UK median age; UK life 
expectancy for women, 2017, W@}. What it means is this V-index operates on the 
stable content, ‘aged’ (the quasi-character of ‘old’), with respect to human’s age, in 
contrast to the median age of UK population, compared to the UK life expectancy for 
women in 2017 at the actual world: 
{human’s age; median age in the UK; life expectancy for British women, 2017, W@} 
 
Another V-index for ‘old’ could be {age; NFL prodigy; NFL sports players, 2006, 
W@}. This context operates on the stable content, ‘aged’ (quasi-character of ‘old’) 
again, with respect to age, in contrast to the age of youngest children sports prodigy, 
compared to the average age of NFL players in 2000 in this actual world.99 
Now we will be able to see why Raffman’s theory of vagueness is called ‘multiple-
range’ theory. It is because the context of a vague predicate, a V-index, determines 
multiple ranges of application of the vague predicate. Going back to the first V-index 
of ‘old’, let’s see how there can be many ranges of application of ‘old’.  
 V-index can also change to a different context. Following the second V-index 
above, ‘old’ is relativized to the age of NFL players. Let’s say that an NFL prodigy 
starts playing American football at age 15; 25 is the average age of NFL players; 40 
is old if one’s a professional football player. Assume that the sorites series here runs 
 
98 V-index is settled by speaker intention as Fodor and Lepore (2004: 8) said: “Nothing about the context of an 
utterance is a metaphysical determinant of its content. The only metaphysical determinants of utterance content 
are (i) the linguistic structure of the utterance (the syntax and lexical inventory of the expression type that it’s a 
token of), and (ii) the communicative intentions of the speaker. Nothing else. Ever.” 
99 One can come up with more examples. Another V-index for ‘old’ could be: {year of construction; 19th century 
buildings; churches from the Middle Ages, 1850, W*}. This context operates on the stable content, ‘aged’ (which 
is the quasi-character of ‘old’), with respect to year of construction, in contrast to the 19th century buildings, 
compared to the churches from the Middle Ages in 1950 at a possible world where industrial revolution did not 
happen. 
Not old   Borderline old Old 
↑0 40 (median age)↑ 61 (mean value)↑ 82 (Life expectancy)↑ 
74 
 
from 40 to 15. Then a 27.5-years-old football player is borderline old. Therefore, a 
competent language user can classify the age from 40 to 30 as old, 40 to 29 as old, 
or 40 to 28 as old. There are multiple ranges of application, and any of these 
applications of ‘old’ are permissible, as long as the age of the language user does not 
go lower than the borderline old. 
As the examples show above, there are multiple permissible extensions of a 
vague predicate. Raffman concludes as the following: “the upshot is that a vague 
predicate does not have a (single) extension in the usual sense” (98). Rather, there 
are many extensions to a vague term, which are all permissible.100 
 
4.1.2 Multi-Range Theory of Vagueness Applied to Moral Semantic Indeterminacy 
In this section, I show how moral realists can explain moral semantic 
indeterminacy, based on Raffman’s multi-range theory of vagueness. My goal in this 
section is to argue that Raffman’s multi-range theory of vagueness is a useful tool for 
moral realists to explain semantic indeterminacy.  
Moral realists have reasons to welcome her theory of vagueness to explain 
semantic indeterminacy. First, her theory is compatible with classical logic. Vague 
words lack sharp boundaries of application, but none of the principles of classical 
logic is violated. The sentences that contain vague predicate are either true or false 
because the truth of a sentence is determined as the following: “a sentence 
containing a vague predicate is true relative to each range of application that 
contains the value instantiated by the item to which the predicate is being applied”, 
according to Raffman (133). 
Second, even though the truth is relative to each range of application, it does not 
mean that vague predicates are response-dependent (169). What determines the 
range of application is the semantics of the predicate, namely its ranges of 
 
100 It is reasonable to object to her theory by saying that stopping at 61 (or 27.5) is too arbitrary. In response to 
such arbitrariness, I provide an answer in chapter 5. 
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application relative to the V-index and the stable content, not the responses or 
judgments of competent speakers. Third, her theory is compatible with truthmaker 
theory. Moral truths are made true in virtue of truthmakers. In her theory, 
truthmaker is a set of values to which a term can competently be applied. A set of 
value represents the multiple permissible ways of applying a vague word (133). 
Let’s apply her theory to morally vague terms which exhibit multidimensional 
vagueness. 101  We saw earlier in §3.1, that an evaluative term ‘courageous’ is 
multidimensionally vague because there are many ways to define it. There are two 
levels of semantic indeterminacy here. First, it is indeterminate which dimensions of 
‘courageous’ are decisive ones. Second, even if the dimensions are set, it is 
indeterminate whether the dimension applies to the extension of the term. To 
simplify the case, suppose that the stable content of ‘courageous’ is ‘bold’ and that 
two dimensions of facing danger and taking risk bravely are at issue. Then 
‘courageous’ is applied relative to two V-indices, for example {facing danger; 
bystander; police officers, 20th century, WDC} and {taking risk bravely; bystanders, 
police officers; 20th century; WDC}. In the first branch of V-index, the sorites series is 
constructed from the bystanders who would not face danger and people who would 
always face danger. In the second branch of V-index, the sorites series is constructed 
from the bystanders who would not take risk bravely to people who would always 
take risk bravely. Here is the spectrum diagram below. The dotted vertical line is 
drawn to show that there is no sharp boundary: 
1) {facing danger; bystanders; police officers, 20th century, WDC} 
 
 
101 Refer to Raffman (2014: 118) for the discussion of multidimensional word, ‘big’. 
Never face 
danger  
Sometimes face 
danger 
Regularly face 
danger 
Always face danger 
↑Bystanders Police Officers ↑  
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2) {taking risk bravely; bystanders; police officers, 20th century; WDC} 
 
In both branches, police officers are the ones who usually take risk bravely and face 
danger. It is permissible for a competent language speaker to apply ‘courageous’ to a 
range of spectrum between the people who always face danger and take risk bravely 
and people who are borderline courageous – they sometimes face danger and take 
risk bravely (See Figure 6).  
 
Given the stable content and the two V-indices, we can analyse what V-index-
relative content of the following utterance, “Superman is courageous”: “Superman is 
bold in both facing danger and taking risk bravely, as opposed to bystanders, 
compared to police officers in the 20th century at the world of DC comics.” Then at 
the world of DC comics, if Superman belongs to the extensions of both V-indices 
where Superman is more courageous than average policemen, then “Superman is 
courageous” is true relative to the pairs in both extensions.102  
1) {facing danger; bystander; police officers, 20th century, WDC} 
 
102 This analysis is similar to Tom Dougherty (2014: 371)’s conclusion that none of the extensions would stand 
out with a special ethical glow. Rather, there is a multiplicity of ethically relevant extensions.  
Never take risk 
bravely 
Sometimes take 
risk bravely 
Regularly take risk 
bravely 
Always take risk 
bravely 
↑Bystanders Police Officers ↑  
Figure 6. The shaded area is where it is permissible for a competent language speaker to apply 
'courageous'. 
Never face 
danger 
Sometimes face 
danger 
Regularly face 
danger 
Always face danger 
Never take risk 
bravely 
Sometimes take 
risk bravely 
Regularly take risk 
bravely 
Always take risk 
bravely 
Never face 
danger 
Sometimes face 
danger 
Regularly face 
danger 
Always face danger 
↑Bystanders Police Officers ↑ ↑Superman 
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2) {taking risk bravely; bystanders; police officers, 20th century; WDC} 
 
This example is relatively easy. As more dimensions are added, it becomes more 
difficult to evaluate the truth of a sentence that contains multidimensional moral 
predicate. 
Consider another example, ‘morally responsible’, which is another 
multidimensional term that I introduced in §3.2.4. Again, there are two levels of 
semantic indeterminacy. It is indeterminate which dimensions of ‘morally 
responsible’ are decisive ones. There are at least five criteria: (a) rationality, (b) self-
governance, (c) capacity to act on the basis of moral considerations, (d) being worthy 
of receiving a certain kind of reactive attitudes like praise and blame, and (e) causal 
connection between the action and its consequence for which the person is 
responsible. It means that a sentence which includes ‘morally responsible’ has at 
least five V-indices. The second level of indeterminacy occurs when, even if the 
criteria are set, it is indeterminate whether each of the criteria applies to the 
extension of the term. Suppose that the stable content of ‘morally responsible’ is 
‘acting in accordance with one’s moral obligations’ and five dimensions are at issue. 
‘Morally responsible’ is applied relative to five V-indices. An example of the first V-
index would be: {rational; people who do not consider relevant reasons for action; 
average people, 2018, W@}. The sorites is constructed from the least rational people 
who consider irrelevant reasons for action to most rational people who consider the 
most relevant reasons for action. A borderline rational person would be a person who 
considers some relevant reasons for action. With this V-index, it is permissible for a 
competent language speaker to apply ‘morally responsible’ to a range of spectrum 
between the people who consider most relevant reasons for action (those who are 
most rational) to people who consider some relevant reasons for action (those who 
Never take 
risks bravely 
Sometimes take 
risks bravely 
Regularly take risks 
bravely 
Always take risks 
bravely 
↑Bystanders Police Officers ↑ ↑Superman 
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are borderline rational). If somebody utters “Sophie is morally responsible” only 
with this V-index in mind, the content is the following: “Sophie rationally acts in 
accordance with her morally obligatory reasons, in contrast with the people who 
consider irrelevant reasons, compared to the average people in 2018 at this actual 
world.” Then at this world, in 2018, if Sophie belongs to the extension of this V-index 
where Sophie is as rational as the average people or more rational than the average 
people, then “Sophie is morally responsible” is true. As more V-indices are added, it 
will be more difficult to evaluate the truth-value of the sentence. If Sophie belongs to 
the extension of every V-index that’s added, then the sentence becomes true.103 Moral 
realism is compatible with this account because the utterance is either true or false. 
It obeys the law of bivalence. There is the fact of the matter that Sophie belongs 
somewhere in these extensions. There is a moral fact in the world: Sophie is the 
truthmaker for this utterance. Still, there is semantic indeterminacy because it is 
permissible for a competent language speaker to refer to multiple extensions of V-
index. However, since they are all permissible application of the term, such semantic 
indeterminacy is harmless. 
Now that the semantics for the multidimensional moral terms is given, which is 
compatible with moral realism, what are the upshots? First, contextualism no longer 
appears to be all hostile towards moral realism: context serves a role in classifying a 
V-index. While context, by itself, cannot provide truth-values for utterances for 
realists, context provides the elements in V-index. These elements are the milestones 
for realists to locate where the truthmaker lies. Second, by separating the stable 
content from the V-index, realists can now explain why it is possible for people to 
use moral terms differently from one another but refer to the same property: the 
stable content of the term stays the same, yet their V-indices could differ.104 Third, 
 
103 The rest of the V-indices can be constructed with different comparison groups, time, and world. An example 
of the second criterion of “morally responsible” would be: {self-governed; children; average school kid; 1900, 
W@}. Third: {capacity to act on the basis of moral considerations; infants; kindergarteners; 2000; W@}. Fourth: 
{being worthy of receiving a certain kind of reactive attitudes; simple calculators; advanced AI; 2500; WStarwars}. 
And keep going. 
104 Similarly, David Manley (Work in progress), for example, argues that moral realists can accept the semantic 
plasticity of moral expressions. See 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1016/d1034b074fe637db653dad3be63a4e9d57bb.pdf 
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the multi-range theory of vagueness applied to moral terms will be able to contribute 
to the Moral Twin Earth debate which Horgan and Timmons (1991) triggered and in 
which Dunaway and McPherson (2016) are currently engaged.105 
 
4.1.3 Objections to Multi-range Theory of Vagueness 
These could be some objections to the multi-range view. First, if we need five or 
more V-indices to figure out the content of a simple utterance such as ‘morally 
responsible’, what are we exactly communicating with each other? Second, not only 
are V-indices always implicated so it is difficult to find out exactly which V-indices 
are implied, but also we are not even sure if we can exhaustively figure out what these 
V-indices are. Third, is it ever possible to figure out the final truth-value of a sentence 
that includes a multidimensional moral term?  
My reply is the following. Regarding the first question, this objection runs 
parallel with the discussion in philosophy of language, regarding the difference 
between what is said and what is meant. Right now, I am interested in figuring out 
what is meant. In chapter 5, when I talk about moral disagreement, I will tackle what 
is communicated. The answer to the question “what is meant?” can be given by 
providing the stable content and the V-index (or V-indices) of a term.  
Regarding the second question, I have two replies. First, V-indices do not always 
have to be explicitly shown. Here’s a sentence, “Huckleberry Finn in courageous”, 
uttered by a reader of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Even though every 
relevant V-index is not explicitly shown, the setting is already given: Huckleberry 
Finn freed the slave, Jim, in the mid-19th century, Missouri. Consider another 
sentence, “Mother Teresa was compassionate.” Again, even though every relevant V-
index is not explicitly shown, the setting is already known: Mother Teresa, the 
Roman Catholic nun who lived in the 20th century, was more caring and sympathetic 
 
105 I would like to engage in this debate in my next project, not in this dissertation. 
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than the average people. It is, quite often, not difficult to figure out the V-indices of 
the utterance.  
Second, moral language is complicated. Many moral terms are multidimensional. 
Many moral terms are open-texture. Some even might be both. Therefore, in the end, 
it might not be possible to exhaustively find out all the V-indices for a moral term. 
However, it does not mean that we are not making any progress. If a term is open-
texture, we will be able to figure out relevant criteria in the future. It is inevitable 
that we cannot have answers to all the moral questions now: Is it morally 
blameworthy if a monogamous couple has sex with a robot? Is it morally permissible 
to eat lab-grown meat? Is it morally wrong to genetically engineer our children’s 
genome? Hopefully, our future generation will better gather morally relevant 
information to these questions which we cannot consider right now. If a term is 
multidimensional, we can restrict our range of discussion since it is difficult to 
exhaust the list of relevant criteria. Consider the term ‘morally responsible’ again. 
We can fix the discussion about who is ‘morally responsible’ in terms of ‘being worthy 
of receiving reactive attitudes.’ It would be out of context if one brings in another V-
index for the term. 
Regarding the third question, it is not the moral realists’ job to figure out the 
objectively fixed truth-value of a moral sentence. As long as moral realists provide 
the semantics for the terms in question, which is compatible with the tenets of moral 
realism, their primary job is done. Sometimes, it takes a long time to figure out moral 
truths. Today, “Slavery is wrong”, “women are not inferior to men”, “human rights 
are for everyone” are obvious moral truths. However, these truths were not obvious 
in the past. There will be moral truths that will sound obvious to our future 
generation but not to us right now. It is possible to figure out the final truth-value of 
a sentence that includes a multidimensional moral term, but it might take a long time. 
I will explain more on this point in chapter 5 in relation to open-texture. 
 
81 
 
4.2 Compatibility Between Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Moral 
Realism 
In this section, I argue that moral realists can explain metaphysical 
indeterminacy not only without falling prey the problem of creeping minimalism but 
also without giving up on classical logic. First, I introduce Elizabeth Barnes’s (2010) 
model of metaphysical indeterminacy. Second, I will then argue that her model is 
compatible with the tenets of moral realism without violating the principle of 
bivalence and LEM. Third, I provide replies to some objections. 
 
4.2.1 Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Ontic Vagueness 
Barnes suggests metaphysical indeterminacy as the following. Barnes (2010: 
605) invites us to imagine a counterfactual scenario where the predicate ‘is bald’ has 
come to mean ‘having less than less than 846 hair.’ Daniel has 846 hair very firmly 
attached to his scalp, while one hair is teetering on the brink, about to be dropped. 
Is Daniel bald? Even with the precisification, there seems to be no fact of the matter 
whether Daniel is definitely bald. Ontic vagueness is that, according to Barnes, even 
if the truthmakers for the given sentence are determined, indeterminacy still 
remains.106 When p is ontically indeterminate, according to Barnes (2010: 611),  
there is not some special state of affairs – the state of affairs of p’s being 
indeterminate – which obtains. Rather, there are two possible states of 
affairs – the state of affairs of things being such that p and the state of 
affairs of things being such that not-p – and it’s simply indeterminate 
which of these two states of affairs in fact obtains. 
 
106 Barnes (2010) uses truthmakers to characterize ontic indeterminacy. Even though Barnes uses truthmakers 
instrumentally in her characterization of ontic indeterminacy, she does not commit to one specific truthmaker 
theory. It is ontologically neutral what one takes these truthmakers to be. Therefore, I take it that it not only is 
compatible with my characterization of moral realism, but also provides a fitting explanation of metaphysical 
indeterminacy in morality. The difference between Shafer-Landau and Barnes is that while Barnes takes possible 
worlds to be truthmakers, Shafer-Landau rejects the talk of truthmakers. Shafer-Landau does not characterize 
realism with truthmakers. Shafer-Landau (2003) writes, “If some standard is true, irreducible, and to be 
construed realistically, then nothing makes it true; its truth is not a creation, but instead a brute fact about the 
way the world works” (48). Therefore, I take Barnes’s possible worlds can be the truthmakers for moral truths in 
moral realism. 
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It is because it can be indeterminate whether that particular truthmaker (or a 
member of a set of truthmakers), in fact, obtains. I reformulate her ontic vagueness 
as: 
(Ontic Vagueness) p is ontically vague when x makes p true, but it is 
indeterminate whether x exists at w. Whether what it takes to make p true 
obtains remains unsettled while what it takes to make p true is settled.  
Barnes takes precisifications to be many different possible worlds. Her proposal 
is that there is a difference between an actual world and an actualized world. There 
is an actual world, which is a mereological sum of concrete objects. There is also an 
actualized world – the abstract world that represents things as being as they are. 
According to Barnes’s possible world theory, every possible world is fully precise as 
they are actual. Ontic indeterminacy is such that it is indeterminate which of the 
possible worlds is actualized: “It is indeterminate which world, out of the many 
worlds that represent things to be a precise way, is the one that represents the way 
the actual world is” (613). 
To simplify the matter, let’s say that W is supposed to be an actualized world, 
and there are only two actual worlds p or p* which could be W or not. W is ontically 
indeterminate as it’s indeterminate which of these two states of affairs in fact obtains. 
There is no midway. It is determinate whether W holds for p or not p, so LEM applies. 
However, indeterminacy leaves the world unsettled. Therefore, it should be the case 
that ∇p or ∇(p*) for W, where ∇ is an operator for indeterminacy. This point is similar 
to Shafer-Landau’s point as well. Even if a constitutive criterion for a property F is 
precisified to be A or B, it is indeterminate whether a criterion A or B holds for F.  
 
4.2.2 Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Moral Realism 
Barnes’s model is advantageous for moral realists because adopting her account 
of metaphysical indeterminacy allows moral realist to avoid the cost of rejecting the 
principle of bivalence and LEM. She claims that the principle of bivalence holds for 
an interpretation of metaphysical indeterminacy: it will be the case that it is 
83 
 
determinate that either p is true or p is false: △ (Tp v Fp), where △ is an operator for 
determinacy. In the actual words, it is determinately the case that p is either true or 
false. What is indeterminate is which truth-value p has. Even though it’s 
determinately the case that p is either true or false, it is indeterminate that either p 
is true or p is false: ∇(Tp) and ∇(Fp). Therefore, the principle of bivalence holds. 
Similarly, LEM holds in her model. According to Barnes (2010: 611), “There are 
only two ways the world could go, a p way and a not-p way; it’s just that the world 
has left it unsettled which of these ways is in fact the case.” It is determinate that 
either p or not-p: △ (p v ~p), but it is indeterminate which one of the worlds is, in 
fact, the actualized world. p and not-p are two possible states of affairs, but it is 
unsettled which state of affair, in fact, obtains: ∇p and ∇(~p). Therefore, LEM holds. 
Now, let’s apply her model to metaphysical indeterminacy in moral realism. First, 
to simplify the matter, let’s assume that there are only two precisified worlds, w and 
w*. There is a possible world w where a moral property wrongness is instantiated 
when you pick up a twenty-pound note on the ground. In w*, wrongness is not 
instantiated when you pick up a twenty-pound note on the ground. Even though 
there is only one determinately actualized world, w and w* disagree over which 
world is actualized: w says “w is actualized. w∗ is not.” whereas w∗ says “w∗ is 
actualized. w is not.” In Barnes’s words, “it’s simply indeterminate which of these 
two states of affairs in fact obtains” (ibid).  
Moral indeterminacy becomes complicated when more criteria are added. Going 
back to the example of Plato being pious, let’s say that a property piousness has only 
two criteria: being faithful to the theological doctrines and dedicated to following the 
religious rules. Then relying on the formula for the number of possible cases (2n 
where n=2), there are four actual worlds: w1(Plato is faithful and dedicated), 
w2(Plato is faithful and not dedicated), w3(Plato is not faithful but dedicated), and 
w4(Plato is not faithful nor dedicated). It is indeterminate not only whether, in w2 
and w3, Plato can be considered as being pious, but also which one of these actual 
worlds is the actualized one. If a property has three criteria, then there are eight (23) 
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possible worlds; four criteria, then sixteen (24). We can say that the world where all 
of these criteria meet is determinately F and the world where all of these criteria do 
not meet is determinately not F. We get a new formula for the number of 
indeterminate possible worlds: 2n-2. However, it is still indeterminate which one of 
these actual worlds is actualized. 
To recap, adopting Barnes’s model, moral realists can now explain metaphysical 
indeterminacy without violating any rules of classical logic. These mind-independent 
possible worlds can be the source of truth conditions for some moral sentences, the 
truth-values of which are sometimes indeterminate. With this model, moral realists 
will not have trouble talking about the indeterminate truth-values of moral sentences 
which correspond to these possible worlds, without violating bivalence and LEM. 
 
4.2.3 Objection to Realists’ Take on Metaphysical Indeterminacy 
One of the well-known objections to realists’ take on metaphysical 
indeterminacy is from Constantinescu (2014). His main point is to question how a 
fixed moral property supervenes on different clusters of natural or non-natural 
vague properties, depending on contextual varieties. He draws the conclusion that 
moral realism is false by arguing that moral realism is incompatible with 
metaphysical indeterminacy. He especially argues against Robust Moral Realism, 
particularly having Shafer-Landau in mind. In this section, I provide replies to 
Constantinescu’s objection.  
According to Constantinescu (2014), moral realism endorses a tenet on 
supervenience: moral facts and properties supervene upon natural or non-natural 
facts and properties. Because moral facts and properties supervene upon natural (or 
non-natural) facts and properties, a moral property, ‘being permissible’, would 
supervene on natural facts about the speaker’s linguistic conventions and attitudes. 
‘Permissibility’ is a non-natural property, a property supervening on clusters of 
natural tropes, just like clusters of clouds rather than a set with a clear boundary. 
Then a cluster of natural tropes Ni constitutes a moral trope Pi. Whenever Ni is 
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present, Pi is present. However, since tropes are clusters just like clouds, Ni would 
always change depending on the contextual variation (Ridge 2007a). It means that 
the same moral trope can be instantiated by different natural tropes in different 
contexts.  
The same argument could also be applied to a cluster of non-naturalistic tropes 
as well. If a cluster of non-natural tropes NNi constitutes a moral trope Pi, then 
whenever NNi is present, Pi is present too.107 Here the problem is similar. Depending 
on the context, Pi can be instantiated by a cluster NN1 through NN10, a cluster NN2 
through NN10, or a cluster through NN3 through NN10, and so on. What exactly is Pi, 
if the same moral trope can be sometimes instantiated by NN1 and sometimes not?108 
The diversity of properties falling under one and the same moral predicate seems 
almost boundless and even gerrymandered (Constantinescu 2014: 167).  
Constantinescu argues that vague moral properties turning out to be coextensive 
with disjunctions of properties in different contexts is problematic for moral realism. 
It is because robust moral realists think that moral facts and properties are mind-
independent and metaphysically sui generis. If a moral property can be instantiated 
by many disjunctions of clusters of natural or non-natural properties depending on 
different contexts, it appears to be mind-dependent and not metaphysically sui 
generis.  
I argue against Constantinescu with three points. First, as I have mentioned 
contextualism in §3.2.1, there is no need for moral realists to ignore contexts all the 
time. Context is part of moral reality. Context is useful for determining the reference 
of vague moral terms. It is just that moral realists cannot rely solely on contexts all 
the time. Just as Raffman’s multi-range theory of vagueness shows, context first 
helps us set a boundary, namely a V-index, of a term.  
 
107 An example of a non-naturalistic property would be an aesthetic property or a legal property. 
108 In Enoch’s terms, general supervenience would hold, but specific supervenience (that a moral property would 
only supervene on specific natural properties) would be violated. 
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Second, I think Constantinescu confuses semantic indeterminacy with 
metaphysical indeterminacy. According to my classification, semantic 
indeterminacy involves indeterminacy of criteria and indeterminacy of reference; 
metaphysical indeterminacy involves whether a property is instantiated or not (or 
whether a world is actualized or not) when certain criteria are given. 
Constantinescu’s description of indeterminacy belongs to semantic indeterminacy, 
not metaphysical indeterminacy because he is concerned with whether a moral 
property is constituted by other properties, namely other criteria, just as I described 
in §3.2.2. Therefore, his complaints can be resolved by providing the semantics of a 
vague term.  
Lastly, as I have argued in §4.2.2, one of the ways to reply to such an objection is 
to adopt Barnes’s (2010) account of ontic vagueness. There are many possible worlds 
in which a moral property is instantiated by these different combinations of natural 
or non-natural tropes. These numerous possible worlds are all actual. They are 
equally important, just as Dougherty (2014: 365) says, “there are multiple extensions 
that form important metaphysical categories, although each extension is equally 
important from a metaphysical point of view”. All of these worlds count. What is 
indeterminate is that whether which one of the actual worlds is actualized.  
 
4.3 Making Moral Decisions under Epistemicism 
In §3.4, I showed that epistemicism, applied to moral matters, is about not 
knowing whether there is a moral fact in the world that Φ-ing is wrong (or right, 
permissible, etc.).109 I have also shown that, under epistemicism, unknown moral 
facts would fail to be action-guiding, and epistemicists cannot rely on their credence. 
 
109 We can draw the parallel between epistemicism and actualism that E. Harman suggests. Actualism is, in 
Harman’s (2015: 59) words, when “a person’s moral beliefs and moral credences are usually irrelevant to how 
she (subjectively) should act. […] What makes it the case, according to Actualism, that Barbara should refrain 
from shooting is simply that she’d be taking a risk of killing someone, not that she’d be doing something that she 
knows is taking a risk of doing something objectively morally wrong—though that is also true in this case.” 
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In this section, I argue unknown moral facts can still be action-guiding. I suggest a 
way for epistemicists to make decisions which would be not running any risk morally.  
First, I want to limit the moral cases that a moral agent faces to the sorites cases. 
Sorites cases run from a moral situation that is definitely permissible to a situation 
that is definitely not permissible. The beginning and the end of the sorites series is 
also known to the agent. What she does not know is where the cut-off point lies in 
this series. In this situation, what should she do?  
Let’s go back to the example that I have constructed in §3.4. You are walking 
down the street, and you see a ten-pound note. Assume that it is definitely 
permissible to pick up a five-pound note off the ground, and it is definitely 
impermissible to pick up a twenty-pound note off the ground. The agent knows this. 
What should she do when she sees a ten-pound note? If one is an epistemicist moral 
agent, I think that the decision she should make is not picking up the ten-pound note 
because there is no risk of doing something morally wrong. Even though her 
credence might motivate her to pick up the ten-pound note, an epistemicist moral 
agent would not want to risk anything morally. She would want to avoid doing 
something morally wrong all the time because she does not know where the cut-off 
point lies.  
It is important to analyse the reasoning process that an epistemicist moral agent 
goes through here. At first, an epistemicist making such a conservative decision 
appears to be unreasonable. It is because the chance of a cut-off point being 
anywhere between 6 and 19 is 1/14 (if we only count the whole numbers). However, 
the cut-off point is not a single point. It is a range from the cut-off point to the end. 
Here’s an analogy. You must imagine a number between 1 and 10. You win if you 
imagine a number that is lower than the number that I choose. Which number would 
you choose? It is safest to bet on the lowest number which is 1.110 Likewise, an 
epistemicist moral agent would always want to choose to make the safest, the most 
conservative decision to avoid doing something morally wrong. 
 
110 Thanks to Mark Bowker for this analogy. 
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Some might argue that it is a bad cost of accepting epistemicism. Here are some 
examples of epistemicist moral agents who demonstrate questionable moral 
conservatism. 
ABORTION: Assume that getting an abortion is definitely permissible at 20-weeks 
of pregnancy and not permissible at 24-weeks of pregnancy. Given that 
abortion could be impermissible at any time between 20-weeks and 24-weeks, 
Abi decides to not get an abortion at 21-weeks of pregnancy even though she 
wants to. 
EUTHANASIA: Assume that performing euthanasia is definitely permissible to the 
terminal cancer patients who are expected to live less than one month and not 
permissible to the patients who are expected to live for more than three 
months. Given that a patient is expected to live two months, the doctor decides 
to not perform euthanasia even though the patient wants her to perform 
euthanasia. 
WINE SHARING: Assume that drinking one glass of wine from a shared bottle of 
wine is definitely permissible and drinking the whole bottle all by oneself is 
not permissible. When offered a second glass of wine, Waldo rejects the offer. 
 
These decisions are questionable because the most conservative moral choices 
appear to conflict with one’s prudential benefit. In the ABORTION case, the rest of 
Abi’s life might be less well-off than life without her child. In the EUTHANASIA case, 
the patient might be suffering unnecessarily for another month. In the WINE SHARING 
case, Waldo might be seen as bad-mannered. If so, these decisions do not seem to be 
morally praiseworthy. 
In response to this point, I say that making a conservative moral decision is still 
a decision. In these soritical cases, I have shown that unknown moral facts do not 
fail to be action-guiding. One can say that it is the limit of making an epistemicism-
inspired moral decision that such decisions might not be prudentially good. I believe 
that it is a small bullet to bite. If one is an epistemicist moral realist, she would think 
that making a conservative moral decision is still better than risking doing something 
that is morally wrong. Avoiding doing what is morally wrong is still better than 
taking chances. As long as unknown moral facts guide our action and morally wrong 
decisions are not made, this is only a small cost to pay. 
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To recap, in chapter 4, I suggested the ways that moral realists can explain 
indeterminacy without violating any of the tenets of moral realism. First, I argued 
that moral realists can use the multi-range theory of vagueness to explain why moral 
terms are semantically indeterminate. Second, I argued that Barnes’ model of 
metaphysical indeterminacy is better at explaining metaphysical indeterminacy than 
Shafer-Landau’s model. Lastly, I argued that moral agents can make moral decisions 
under epistemicism because unknown moral facts can be action-guiding. In chapter 
5, I conclude the thesis by showing that moral realists have better explanatory power 
than anti-realists in the moral disagreement debate. It is because moral realists are 
now able to explain different types of disagreement with three types of 
indeterminacy whereas anti-realists can only appeal to semantic indeterminacy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In order to argue that moral realism is compatible with moral indeterminacy, I 
have achieved the following. In chapter 2, I gave a definition of moral realism by 
suggesting the basic tenets of moral realism. In chapter 3, I showed that there are 
some conflicts between moral realism and semantic indeterminacy, metaphysical 
indeterminacy, and epistemic indeterminacy. Finally, in chapter 4, I have argued 
that moral realists can resolve these conflicts. Moral realists can explain moral 
indeterminacy without violating any of the tenets of moral realism and even endorse 
all three types of indeterminacy. Therefore, I concluded that moral realism is 
compatible with indeterminacy.  
Following the conclusion above, I have two points to make in this last chapter. 
First, in contrast to how some philosophers argue that all moral indeterminacy can 
be, in fact, reduced to one kind of indeterminacy (for instance, reduced to 
metaphysical indeterminacy (Schoenfield 2015) or epistemicism (Williamson 1994)), 
I will argue that every kind of indeterminacy will have its own place. When every 
kind of indeterminacy has its own place, moral realists can appeal to each type of 
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indeterminacy to explain not only faultless moral disagreement but also resolvable 
or irresolvable moral disagreement.  
Second, because indeterminacy works as a more useful tool to realists than anti-
realists according to my arguments above, I argue that moral realism would have 
more explanatory power than anti-realism. This second point contributes to the 
debates between anti-realism and realism in meta-ethics in such a way that realists 
are now able to explain moral indeterminacy with metaphysical, semantic, and 
epistemic explanations whereas anti-realists cannot, giving more explanatory power 
to moral realism. 
 
5.1 Moral Disagreement and Indeterminacy 
In this section, I will show how moral realists can appeal to each type of 
indeterminacy to explain different types of moral disagreement: faultless 
disagreement, irresolvable disagreement, and resolvable disagreement. I argue that 
semantic indeterminacy is helpful to explain faultless moral disagreements; 
metaphysical indeterminacy is helpful to explain genuine moral disagreements 
which are irresolvable; epistemicism is helpful to explain moral disagreements that 
might be resolvable in the future.  
 
5.1.1 Semantic Indeterminacy, Arbitrariness, and Faultless Disagreement  
It has been a difficult problem for moral realists to explain moral disagreement, 
especially faultless disagreement. Faultless disagreement is such that: 
A faultless disagreement is a situation where there is a thinker A, a thinker 
B, and a proposition (content of judgment) p, such that (a) A believes 
(judges) that p and B believes (judges) that not-p. (b) Neither A nor B has 
made a mistake (is at fault) (Kölbel 2004: 53-54). 
Moral realists would commonly want to argue that faultless disagreement is 
impossible because, in every moral dispute, either p or not-p must be true. We might 
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disagree now whether p or not-p because we have not discovered enough objective 
moral facts to settle the disagreement. Those disagreements we have now are not 
faultless. Once all the relevant moral facts are discovered, there will be convergence.  
However, there might be some advantages for moral realists to say that faultless 
moral disagreement is possible because, first, saying that there is no faultless moral 
disagreement is unintuitive. As Hills (2013: 415) points out, “faultless disagreement 
in ethics is a phenomenon that many people think is not just possible, but actual (…) 
this is one of the main reasons why many people think that some form of moral 
relativism must be correct.” If moral realists successfully explain how faultless 
disagreement is possible without endorsing any moral relativism, moral realists 
would be able to provide a strong counterargument against moral objectivism. 
In this section, I show that moral realists can appeal to semantic indeterminacy 
to explain how faultless moral disagreement is possible. Sometimes, moral 
disagreements turn out to be faultless because our language is, by nature, 
indeterminate. Moral realists can appeal to semantic indeterminacy to explain 
faultless moral disagreement by appealing to arbitrary, yet faultless stopping points 
occurring in sorites series. 
First, let’s bring back the sorites example from chapter 1 and the V-index from 
chapter 4 to explain arbitrary stopping points. Assume that it is permissible to pick 
up a five-pound note off the ground is permissible, but twenty-pound note off the 
ground is not. We can construct a sorites series, which ends up in a paradox, from 
this example.  
To recap from chapter 3, a sorites series is comprised of formal induction steps 
which end up in a paradox.111 Sorites series is paradoxical because the conclusion is 
false while all the premises are true (or vice versa). The Standard Sorites looks like 
below: 
 
111 Of course, defining the sorites series with formal induction steps is not the only way to formulate Sorites series. 
See Hyde (2008: 10-15) for formulating different Sorites series. 
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Fa1 
Fa1 > Fa2 
Fa2 > Fa3 
… 
Fak-1 > Fak 
--------------------------- 
∴ Fak (for any number k) 
△True 
? 
? 
… 
? 
 
△False 
 
‘△’ stands for ‘definitely’; ‘F’ represents a soritical predicate such as ‘permissible’; ‘>’ 
represents the connective modus ponens, “if … then …”; the series, <a1, …, ak>, 
represents the sequence of subjects, e.g. <five-pounds, 6-pounds…, k pounds> (Hyde 
2008: 10). An argument is soritical when (1) the first argument in the series is 
definitely true (e.g. picking up a five-pound note is permissible); (2) the last 
argument is definitely false (e.g. picking up a twenty-pound note is permissible); (3) 
in between, there are arguments that fail to be definitely true or definitely false (e.g. 
picking up a ten-pound note is permissible). These arguments between the first and 
the last argument are the arguments that we are interested in because this is where 
faultless disagreement occurs, as semantic indeterminacy appears here. 
Imagine two people arguing whether picking up a ten-pounds note off the 
ground is permissible, or eleven-pounds is permissible. We can say that these two 
people are having a faultless disagreement. How so? It is because the difference is 
sufficiently small that applying the term, ‘permissible’, to ten-pounds but not to 
eleven-pounds is arbitrary. This is to follow Raffman (2014)’s strategy: “the 
increments between adjacent items in a sorites series are sufficiently small as to 
make any differential application of the predicate as between them, that is, any 
application of ‘Ф’ to one but not to the other, arbitrary” (123). For example, if it is 
permissible to pick up ten-pounds off the ground, then it is arbitrary to say that 
picking up eleven-pounds off the ground is permissible. If it is permissible to pick up 
eleven-pounds off the ground, then it is arbitrary to say picking up twelve-pounds 
off the ground permissible.  
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Moreover, it is also permissible for one person to stop in the middle of the sorites 
series while the other does not. For example, in the series of picking up five-pounds 
note (permissible) to twenty-pounds note (not permissible), a moral agent may 
permissibly stop picking up unattended notes off the ground at 12 pounds or 13 
pounds. A particular, single stopping place is not required; multiple stopping points 
are permissible, too, and these are all faultless stopping points. 
Stopping at arbitrary points or having multiple stopping points is faultless 
because it is not completely random, irrational, unintelligible, or response-
dependent (Raffman 2014: 169). The judgment of the competent language users does 
not solely determine whether a predicate, ‘permissible’, correctly refers to an object. 
Rather, as we have seen in §4.1, the V-index determines the referent. In sum, 
faultless disagreement occurs only when there the difference is sufficiently small that 
applying a vague moral term to one but not the other is arbitrary.  
 
5.1.2 Epistemicism, Open-Texture, and Resolvable Disagreement  
Not like faultless disagreements, some moral disagreements can be resolved. 
Although they might not be resolvable right now, they might get resolved in the 
future. Why is it difficult to define moral concepts and laws strictly? It is because, 
according to Hart (1961), we are ignorant of all the relevant circumstances to know 
how moral terms refer:  
The first handicap is our relative ignorance of fact; the second is our relative 
indeterminacy of aim. If the world in which we live were characterized only 
by a finite number of features, and these together with all the modes in which 
they could combine were known to us, then provision could be made in 
advance for every possibility (125).  
The world is, unfortunately, characterized by an uncountable number of features, 
nor all the combination of these features are known to us now.  
In this section, I explain what open-texture is and how some moral 
disagreements are affected by open-texture. When a term is open-texture, no matter 
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how precisely we define the term, there are always possible conditions which we have 
not taken into account to know whether the term applies or not (Waismann 1945: 
123). To give an ordinary example, the term ‘meat’ is open-texture. Even though 
‘meat’ is now broadly defined as the flesh of an animal, in near future there will be 
situations where it is indeterminate to decide whether ‘meat’ applies to the cultured 
meat grown from vitro animals cell culture, due to technological advancements. 
Waismann shows that common words, such as ‘man’, ‘gold’, and ‘cat’, can also 
be open-texture: “Suppose I come across as being that looks like a man, speaks like 
a man, and is only one span tall – shall I say it is a man?” (1945: 120). When a term 
is open-texture, there are cases that the term is definitely applied, cases that the term 
is definitely not applied, and cases that it is questionable whether that term is applied 
or not. When two people disagree on these questionable cases, their dispute is about 
whether or not the meaning of the term justifies the application of the term. 
Some moral terms are also open-texture. It is difficult to pinpoint the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for their correct application (Brennan 1977: 104). For 
example, ‘abortion’, ‘euthanasia’, ‘capital punishment’, and ‘murder’ are open-
texture. Consider a case provided by Brennan (1977: 121). Suppose that a police 
officer and a criminal are in conversation: 
P: You were wrong to murder that bank clerk. 
C: What was wrong about it? 
P: You killed him and killing is wrong. 
C: How about you? You shot Pete Jones. 
P: But that was in self-defence. 
C: All right. But what about Sam Smith? They hanged him when he was 
defenceless and offered no threat to them. 
P: But he was a convicted murderer. 
In this conversation, the police officer applies the term ‘murder’ to the criminal’s 
action (killing the bank clerk), but not to her own action (killing Pete Jones in self-
defence). The police officer keeps identifying the relevant cases to which she thinks 
the term ‘murder’ applies, but such a process cannot be completed. Certainly, the 
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police officer can say that ‘murder’ means ‘unjustifiable homicide’, but it will be no 
help in figuring out which homicide cases are definitely murder.112 
As this example shows, when a moral term is open-texture, it is indeterminate 
whether the term definitely refers to its reference. It is because it is impossible to 
know all the relevant considerations. Open-texture is different from context-
sensitivity, soriticality, and vagueness in a way that the correct application of the 
term will be determined once all the relevant information is discovered.113  
Open-texture does not allow arbitrariness, not like semantic indeterminacy (as 
we have seen in §5.1.1), context-sensitivity, soriticality, or vagueness (Raffman 2014: 
125). Natural terms, such as ‘strawberry’ and ‘dog’, are open-texture in a way that the 
classification of such terms might vary but not arbitrarily. Let’s assume that some 
biologists discovered an animal located between dog and wolf in the chain of 
evolution. If they disagree whether this animal is a dog or a wolf, that is a genuine 
disagreement because there is a fact of the matter whether this animal is a dog or a 
wolf. All the relevant information is not discovered yet for us to classify it as a dog or 
a wolf, yet. The application of an open-texture term will be determinate at some point 
in the future because the interlocutors “would have reasons for changing their 
classifications and would take themselves to be correcting their previous judgments” 
(ibid.). Therefore, the terms that are open-texture inevitably cause disagreement. 
Some of the moral disagreement will be resolved when the relevant facts are revealed 
in the future. Some moral facts are determinate; we are just unaware of them for now. 
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112 Hart (1961) points out that the moral concepts, which are explicated in the form of rules of conduct, are also 
open-texture because not only are the words that make up the rules open texture, but also it is impossible to 
foresee every possible combination of circumstances in framing these rules. Brennan (1977) adds that it is 
impossible to completely explicate the moral concepts in terms of these rules of conduct. 
113 However, Shapiro (2013: 310) equates open-texture with context-sensitivity. He defines open-texture as “at 
least some conversational situations, a speaker is free to assert Pa and free to assert ¬Pa, without offending 
against the meanings of the terms, against any other rule of language use, and against the non-linguistic facts. 
Unsettled entails open.” I think open-texture and context-sensitivity are different in a way that open-texture 
doesn’t rely on judgments of speakers only whereas context-sensitivity does. 
114 This is Enoch (2011: 78)’s position. 
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5.1.3 Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Genuine Disagreement  
Despite there being faultless disagreements and resolvable disagreements, some 
disagreements might not be resolvable at all, even though it is clear that one party is 
absolutely at fault. As Shafer-Landau (1994) points out, some moral disagreements 
might even persist among ideally rational, fully informed moral agents who share 
the same meaning and use the same word.  
I call such a disagreement ‘genuine’ when the speakers, who use the same word 
to mean the same thing, cannot reach an agreement with each other. A well-known 
example of a genuine disagreement is from Hare (1952: 148). Let’s assume that a 
missionary and a cannibal use the word ‘good’ with the same meaning in mind: the 
most general adjective of commendation. The following is where the missionary and 
the cannibal disagree: the cannibal applies the word ‘good’ to bold and burly people 
who collect scalps by killing people more than the average, whereas the missionary 
applies the word ‘good’ to meek and gentle people who do not collect large quantities 
of scalps. The cannibal and the missionary communicate with each other with no 
misunderstanding. It is just that the application of the word ‘good’ differs from one 
another. 
If the example above is not resolvable at all, it is because it is indeterminate 
which world, out of the two worlds that represent ‘good’ in different ways, is the 
actualized world, as Barnes’s model of metaphysical indeterminacy shows. Both 
worlds, which are described by the missionary and the cannibal, are actual worlds. 
However, it is indeterminate which of these worlds is the actualized world – the 
abstract world that represents things as being as they are. If this is the case, then 
genuine disagreements are possible. It is the case that one party is definitely at fault, 
but it is metaphysically indeterminate to point out which party is at fault. 
In sum, some moral disagreements originate from semantic indeterminacy, 
therefore can be faultless. Some of the moral disagreement will be resolved because 
there are determinate moral facts. We are just unaware of them due to our epistemic 
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limitations; they are to be discovered in the future. Some moral disagreements might 
not be resolvable at all because they originate from metaphysical indeterminacy. 
 
5.2 Indeterminacy Providing More Explanatory Power to Moral 
Realists 
Throughout the history of metaethics, many anti-realists, such as Mackie (1977: 
36), Gibbard (1990: ch. 1), and Blackburn (1984: 168), have taken the prevalence and 
persistence of moral disagreement to be a powerful argument for defending their 
view. Anti-realists have been comfortably accepting the fact that moral disagreement 
is prevalent. Failure of convergence is inevitable in ethics because it is usually 
indeterminate to decide who is or which moral theory is objectively right.  
It has been usually the case that anti-realists explain moral disagreement by 
appealing to indeterminate or vague moral propositions. For example, Stephen 
Schiffer (2005) argues that even though there are truth-evaluable moral 
propositions, not one of them can be determinately true. He holds that moral 
concepts supervene on non-normative concepts such as conative facts. Since the 
conative facts are considerably vague, “the concept of having a certain moral concept, 
such as the concept of moral wrongness, is extremely vague” (258). Since vague 
moral propositions are neither determinately true nor determinately false, it is 
always possible for two people to disagree about the truth-value of any moral 
proposition.  
It has been easier for anti-realists than for realists to appeal to indeterminacy to 
explain prevalent moral disagreement. It is because anti-realists can simply say that 
indeterminacy arises from the differences in our values, opinions, or social norms. 
They can appeal to the differences in cultures to explain why moral disagreement is 
prevalent. Since it is indeterminate whether one culture is right or wrong, moral 
disagreement inevitably arises between these cultures. Such an explanation of moral 
disagreement appears more intuitive than appealing to objective moral facts.  
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Therefore, the goal of my dissertation was to provide a way for moral realists to 
explain indeterminacy as well without any inconsistency or incompatibility. I have 
first defined moral realism (§2) and explained that there are three kinds of 
indeterminacy (§3) – semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic. I then argued that not 
only is moral realism compatible with all three kinds of indeterminacy (§4), but also 
moral realists can explain different types of moral disagreement – faultless, 
resolvable, and genuine – with different types of indeterminacy (§5.1).  
The upshot of my research is that moral realists have now gained explanatory 
power towards moral disagreement. They can now explain different types of moral 
disagreement through metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic indeterminacy 
without denying any tenets of moral realism. Moral realists can still uphold their 
tenet on moral objectivity, which is one of the appealing features of moral realism 
while embracing indeterminacy. If the strength of a theory is measured by how much 
explanation it can provide, my dissertation has shown that moral realism wins over 
anti-realism in this regard.  
Would all moral realists welcome my conclusion? No. Enoch (2009), as a robust 
moral realist, would reject my conclusion. Enoch thinks that indeterminacy can play 
some role in accounting for moral disagreement, but it should not play the key role 
in explaining disagreement. Enoch has two worries on this topic. The first worry is 
that if there is genuine indeterminacy, Enoch thinks that both parties are at fault, 
rather than only one. When two parties genuinely disagree on a moral matter, both 
parties must be at fault. Enoch thinks that this is not explanatory progress because 
it is parsimonious to say that one party is at fault rather than two. I think Enoch’s 
first worry is misguided. As I have explained in §5.1.3, if there is genuine 
disagreement, then one of the parties is at fault when they disagree. It is just 
indeterminate to decide which party is at fault. 
Enoch’s second worry is about the prevalence of moral indeterminacy. If we 
pinpoint indeterminacy as the cause of moral disagreement, he thinks that most 
cases of moral controversies would turn out to be indeterminate. Given that moral 
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disagreement is massively prevalent, there may not be many determinate moral 
truths. Enoch thinks that this is not a victory for moral realists.  
Against Enoch’s worry that if we explain moral disagreement with indeterminacy 
there would be too much indeterminacy, I answer Enoch’s worry is misguided. It is 
because moral realists can now distinguish different types of moral disagreement 
with different types of indeterminacy. Sometimes, having too much indeterminacy 
might not be problematic because some disagreements, which originate from 
semantic indeterminacy, might be faultless. Conversely, there could not be much 
indeterminacy after all since some moral disagreements originate from our 
epistemic limitations. The moral truth could be discovered in near future. Not all 
moral disagreement is genuine, therefore there is no need to worry about prevalent 
metaphysical indeterminacy. 
In conclusion, intuitively, we do not want to say that all morality is relative to 
our opinions or culture. There are objective moral facts: slavery is wrong; women are 
not inferior to men. At the same time, we also want to accept the fact that there is 
indeterminacy in our world: moral disagreements are prevalent and differences in 
our opinions and culture are persistent. Only by taking moral indeterminacy 
seriously, we can achieve harmony between indeterminacy and morality. My 
dissertation aimed to show that moral realism is better at preserving harmony 
between indeterminacy and morality than anti-realists do. 
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